Vectors For Safety - September 2026

September 1, 2026

New "Essential Vectors" video: Bounced Landing

Check out our latest "Essential Vectors" video! This less than 10-minute video looks at the primary cause of a bounced landing, an effective way to prevent the bounced landing, how the startle effect may result, and some guidance on how to respond to a bounce. Click here to see the video without those annoying YouTube ads!

(Another) New "Essential Vectors" video: Rotor Wash Essentials

This less than 5-minute video explains the dangers of rotor wash generated by a helicopter. Did you know that rotor wash can be much more powerful than wake turbulence? Click here to see the video without those annoying YouTube ads!

Recommended Issue of NASA "Callback"

The August 2026 issue of NASA "Callback" is a good one, dealing with flight into complex airspace. Check out Issue #559 here.

New edition of "Old Pilot Tips"

Many landing mishaps follow a bounced landing. This video shows, in less than one minute, the primary causes of a bounced landing and effective ways to avoid this embarrassing and potentially dangerous event. Sponsored by Avemco Insurance. Click here to watch it on YouTube.

Book Your Free Virtual Safety Seminar

Whether your pilot group meets all together, virtually, or hybrid, you can schedule a program, valid for FAA Wings credit, free-of-charge courtesy of Avemco Insurance. Programs are live with Gene Benson and always include a Q&A session at the end. Click here to download our presentation catalog. For more info or to schedule, contact gene@genebenson.com.

The Anatomy of a Bounce: Understanding the Mental Pivot

There is a distinct, sudden, and sinking realization that washes over a general aviation pilot when we find ourselves inexplicably back in the air after believing we were safely on the ground. This is embarrassing at best, but the potentially deadly at worst, bounced landing. It serves as a study in both human factors and pilot psychology. When a bounce occurs upon touchdown, a pilot’s brain is forced through an incredibly rapid sequence of cognitive, physiological, and psychological shifts, all occurring within a mere fraction of a second. To understand the inherent danger and the necessary recovery techniques, we must carefully explore exactly what happens in the human mind and body during this brief, critical window.

The precise moment the airplane's tires touch the tarmac, the pilot's brain instinctively initiates a transition from active flight mode to rollout mode. At this stage, the absolute expectation is deceleration and the assumption of immediate ground control. However, when the plane unexpectedly rebounds off the runway, a violent sensory mismatch immediately occurs. This disconnect is both vestibular and visual in nature. The inner ear suddenly senses an unexpected upward acceleration, or a distinct un-weighting sensation, while simultaneously, the visual horizon abruptly shifts as the runway drops away from the pilot's line of sight.
This sensory chaos triggers the startle effect, leading directly to an amygdala hijack. For one to two agonizing seconds, the high-level executive cognitive processing centers located in the prefrontal cortex effectively freeze. In this sudden void, the primitive brain violently takes over, flooding the pilot's physiological system with adrenaline, drastically spiking their heart rate, and significantly degrading the fine motor skills required to safely operate the aircraft.
Compounding this extreme physiological stress is a powerful psychological phenomenon we know as plan-continuation bias. The human brain naturally despises switching tasks mid-stream. By the time the aircraft's wheels touch down, the pilot has already spent the last several minutes intensely calculating wind drift, carefully managing the glideslope, and preparing for the final landing phase. Mentally, we have already parked the aircraft and are taxiing to the ramp. Because of this tremendous sunk cost of the approach, a very strong subconscious bias urges us to force our original plan to work rather than abandoning it for a new course of action.
This bias manifests as a desperate, overwhelming urge to try to get the wheels back on the ground immediately, rather than logically accepting the reality that the airplane is now flying again.
Under this sudden, intense stress, a pilot's field of attention narrows dramatically through cognitive tunneling. Because our attention has tunneled purely onto the singular goal of getting back down to the runway, the brain completely ignores critical situational context, such as the aircraft's current pitch attitude or its airspeed. This extreme tunneling can lead directly to the most dangerous instinct and common panic reaction to a bounce: abruptly pushing the control stick or yoke forward to physically force the nose down. Executing this aggressive maneuver while high above the ground almost guarantees a catastrophic nose-gear strike, or triggers porpoising.
The divide between a minor, easily corrected event and a severe landing accident ultimately comes down to how quickly an individual pilot can execute a mental pivot, successfully transitioning away from an instinctive reaction and toward a trained, calculated response. In an unmanaged, instinctive reaction, the pilot pushes the nose forward, tunnels their vision entirely on the runway threshold, and desperately fights the airplane onto the ground. Conversely, the highly trained cognitive response dictates that the pilot must hold the pitch steady, essentially freezing the control wheel to prevent exacerbating the bounce. Following this, they must consciously assess the aircraft's energy, pitch attitude, and the amount of remaining runway before deciding to either make a smooth pitch adjustment or initiate an immediate go-around.
To successfully override the sheer panic of the primordial brain, effective and repetitive flight training builds a deep muscle-memory reflex anchored in a simple, unyielding rule: when in doubt, go around. By simply adding full engine power and establishing a proper climb attitude, the pilot completely bypasses the complex, compromised decision-making process, effectively resetting our workload back to a safe, highly familiar maneuver.
However, there may exist rare cases in which, due to obstacles or rising terrain ahead, a go-around is not prudent. Study of the airport before arrival can allow for preplanning if a runway does not present a safe go-around path. Briefing the approach, including go-around procedures, can pre-load the brain to prevent the amygdala hijack and favor the best response when the unexpected happens.

Want to learn more about cognitive science and how it applies to the general aviation pilot? Check out our "Squawking Human" feature!

Bouncing Back to Basics

This month I want to get back to something that seems very basic at first, but becomes much more complex and potentially dangerous on further study. Whether you fly a large airliner, a business jet, a single-engine turboprop, or the smallest of the piston powered singles, a bounced landing can be the beginning of an unfortunate series of events. Let’s take a deeper dive into the bounced landing.

A bounced landing is something nearly every pilot experiences at some point, especially during training. It happens when the airplane touches down and then immediately becomes airborne again. While a small bounce is often harmless, how a pilot reacts in the next second or two can make the difference between a routine landing and an accident. The first bounce triggers our urgent decision making mechanisms and those ensuing lightning fast decisions can make the difference between a mild embarrassment and substantially damaged airplane and potential injuries. The good news is that bounced landings are usually manageable when we understand what causes them and recognize the proper recovery techniques.

At its core, a bounce is an energy management problem. When an aircraft arrives over the runway carrying too much speed, descending too quickly, or touching down at the wrong attitude, the landing gear can act like a spring. Instead of settling onto the runway, the airplane rebounds back into the air. Excessive approach speed is a common contributor because the wings are still producing significant lift at touchdown. A late or abrupt flare can also result in a hard landing that compresses the landing gear and launches the aircraft upward again. Flat landings, where the nose is too low, can increase the wing's angle of attack after impact and create a sudden burst of lift. Even environmental factors such as gusts or thermal lift rising off a warm runway can contribute to an unexpected bounce.

What makes a bounce unsettling is how quickly conditions change. After the initial touchdown, the aircraft often loses airspeed rapidly. The airplane can find itself a few feet above the runway with less energy than the pilot realizes. At that point, a calm and measured response becomes critical.

For a small bounce, less is better than more. Instead of pushing the nose down or pulling back aggressively, we should hold the existing pitch attitude, add a small amount of power to cushion the next touchdown, and allow the aircraft to settle back onto the runway as speed decreases. Once firmly on the ground, power can be reduced to idle and the landing completed normally.

A larger bounce tells a different story. If the airplane rebounds several feet into the air or appears to hang above the runway while losing airspeed, attempting to salvage the landing can become risky. In those cases, the safest option is often an immediate go-around. Applying full power, establishing a safe climb attitude, and setting up for another approach removes the pressure of forcing a bad landing to work. Remember to compensate for the increased torque as power is added. The more powerful the engine and the lower the airspeed, the more rudder movement will be needed.

Many of the most serious landing accidents are not caused by the initial bounce itself but by the pilot's reaction afterward. One common hazard is porpoising, a pilot-induced oscillation that can develop when the pilot pushes forward on the controls after a bounce. The nose wheel strikes first, rebounds, and can send the airplane into progressively larger oscillations that may end with structural damage. Another danger occurs when a pilot pulls back too aggressively in an attempt to stay airborne, potentially leading to a stall just a few feet above the runway and a hard impact on landing gear.

Fortunately, preventing bounced landings begins long before the wheels touch the runway. Maintaining a stabilized approach at the correct speed, looking toward the far end of the runway during the flare, and resisting the temptation to "save" a poor landing all go a long way toward reducing risk. In fact, one of the best habits a pilot can develop is knowing when to go around. A second approach may cost a few extra minutes, but it is far preferable to dealing with damaged equipment or an accident investigation.

Accidents discussed in this section are presented in the hope that pilots can learn from the misfortune of others and perhaps avoid an accident. It is easy to read an accident report and dismiss the cause as carelessness or as a dumb mistake. But let's remember that the accident pilot did not get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I'll go have an accident today." Nearly all pilots believe that they are safe. Honest introspection frequently reveals that on some occasion, we might have traveled down that same accident path.

This accident happened in Idaho in January 2026. None of the four occupants of the Cessna T206H were injured but the airplane was substantially damaged. The NTSB characterized the defining event as a hard landing. The 38-year-old private pilot had a current flight review and a valid medical certificate with total flight time of 523 hours including 458 hours in this make and model.

NTSB Supplied Photo

The NTSB accident report begins: "The pilot of the airplane reported that after descending through a cloud layer on an instrument approach, he acquired the airport environment and continued the approach to land in visual meteorological conditions. During the landing flare, the airplane landed hard and then bounced. On subsequent landing the empennage struck the runway surface, followed by the nose wheel, which resulted in a tire blowout. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the empennage."

NTSB Photo

The NTSB probable cause states: "The pilot’s improper landing flare, which resulted in hard, bounced landing and subsequent tail strike."

Lewiston/Nez Perce County airport (Google Earth)

In the NTSB Form 6120.1 submitted by the pilot, he states "Corrective Actions: I plan to complete additional landing proficiency training with a qualified flight instructor focusing on bounce recovery procedures, go-around decision making, and energy management during landing."

The landing runway, runway 26, was 6511 feet long by 150 feet wide. The wind was reported as being from 290 degrees at 4 knots, meaning that there was no appreciable crosswind. The transition from being in the clouds to executing a visual landing can sometimes be problematic, but the ceiling was reported to be 3,500 feet so there should have been sufficient time for the adjustment. The pilot was marginally current in the airplane with a reported 17 hours in the preceding 90 days, 3 hours in the preceding 30 days and 1 hour in the preceding 24 hours. It is not stated, but likely all was in the accident airplane.

So what went wrong? We cannot know, but perhaps some complacency had set in or perhaps there was a distraction of some kind, or maybe the pilot was not at his best on that day due to fatigue or for some other reason. His stated corrective actions should be considered good advice for any pilot who has not had any challenging dual instruction is awhile.

Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.

This crash involved a Mooney M20E and again had a stated defining event as a hard landing. It happed in in Louisiana in December 2025. The pilot and safety pilot both received minor injuries. The analysis section of the NTSB report states, "The pilot and his safety pilot were conducting a proficiency flight for insurance purposes. According to the pilot, he began the landing flare too high and the airplane bounced when the main wheels touched down. The safety pilot reported that he monitored the pilot’s remedial action to the bounced landing. According to the safety pilot, the pilot increased airplane pitch but did not increase engine power which resulted in a second bounced landing. The safety pilot then took over the flight controls and advanced the throttle to maximum rpm. The safety pilot stated that he was unable to regain directional control and the airplane touched down a third time, veered left, passed through a fence, and impacted trees. The airplane sustained substantial damage to both wings, the fuselage, and the horizontal stabilizer. Both pilots reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. Additionally, the safety pilot stated that the accident might have been prevented had he taken over controls and/or called for an aborted landing sooner."

NTSB Supplied Photo

The 66-year-0ld private pilot had 707 total flight hours including 46 hours in this make and model. The 60-year-old safety pilot is listed as having commercial/private pilot certification with 1665 total flight hours including 447 hours in this make and model.

The NTSB probable cause states: "The pilot’s improper pitch control that resulted in a hard landing, and his improper recovery from multiple bounced landings. Contributing to the accident was the safety pilot’s delayed response to the initial bounced landing which led to the runway excursion."

NTSB Supplied Photo

The safety pilot's submission to the NTSB states in part, "I was PIC from the right seat and was poised to take controls at any moment. I judged that (redacted) responding correctly to the excessive energy on landing at the moment of the first bounce, and let him continue without intervention. After the second bounce, I made the split second decision to let him continue to correct the situation, believing that he would do so properly. The time that passed while he then hesitated to act, and then applied the wrong control input, was enough that if I had intervened at the moment of the second bounce, either by calling for a go around or taking controls myself, we would have been able to go around successfully. I should have acted sooner in the moment of landing difficulty. As I am not a certificated CFI, I should not have let the situation progress to that point where the safety of flight was actually in question. I have wanted to become a CFI for quite some time, and many pilots and instructors have encouraged me to do so. But I have not had the time to devote to the formal process yet, and I should have been more conservative in my decision making."

Louisiana Regional Airport (Google Earth)

There is quite a lot of description provided regarding the actions taken after the initial bounce, but nothing about the "significant seconds" just before touchdown. A bounce usually occurs because the airplane had too much energy at touchdown which in turn usually indicates that the approach was not stabilized. We talk about energy management, but if all the criteria for a stabilized approach are met during the "significant seconds" just before touchdown, the energy will be properly managed.

Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.

This crash occurred in North Carolina in April 2024 and involved a Socata TBM 850 which was substantially damaged.. The 65-year-old 16,000 hour Airline Transport Pilot was seriously injured and his passenger received minor injuries.

NTSB Supplied Photo

The NTSB report includes the following: "The pilot executed an approach that, based on the passenger’s description, was not stabilized, and the airplane touched down twice during landing. The propeller blades made contact with the runway, and the pilot decided to abort the landing because he did not think he could stop the airplane on the runway. During the subsequent takeoff and initial climb, the pilot made a tight left turn about 100 ft above ground level to avoid traffic on an intersecting runway, and the airplane entered an aerodynamic stall and impacted the ground. Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no preimpact malfunction or deficiency that would have precluded normal operation."

NTSB Supplied Photo

The NTSB report continues: "Although the right main landing gear was found in the stowed position and its wheel axle and gear door showed scraping marks, an airport surveillance video showed that all three landing gear appeared to be in the down position during the airplane’s takeoff after the aborted landing."

Compiled Video (Three Surveillance Videos from the NTSB Accident Docket)

The NTSB probable cause states: "The pilot’s decision to continue an unstabilized approach, which resulted in a bounced landing, and his failure to maintain proper airspeed and climb attitude after aborting the landing, which led to the airplane exceeding its critical angle of attack and resulting in an aerodynamic stall."

NTSB Supplied Photo

The following is an excerpt of the pilot’s written statement to the FAA via email: “I am not clear on all that occurred, I have been told what was on the video and part seems to not match what I can remember. I am sorry, I remember seeing the dust from the prop, and this is where my memory begins. I felt I couldn’t stop on 32 and would cross 23L, I remember hearing the tower clear an airliner to land on 23L, and I had a strong fear I could cause a collision, I thought I called the tower and asked for 23L and not hearing an answer was afraid the airliner and I were close. I tightened my left turn to try 14, I knew the engine was damaged and had no plans to leave the airport area, there are too many houses and stuff and I didn’t feel confident in it staying together, so as I tightened up the turn, to get away from 23L the plane stalled, honestly I was stunned, I thought I had landing flaps selected. My last thought was to unload the wing and try to flatten contact with the ground. I can’t remember the act, but I will be forever grateful my passenger was and is fine. I will give you more information as I remember, I hope this helps and if there is anything I can do to help you please let me know.”

The following is a summary of an interview conducted by the FAA with the passenger: "According to Dr. Chelminski, the airplane was “rolling” and “tobogganing…as if we were descending a hill on the snow” during the final approach. He said the airplane touched down twice, after which the pilot appeared to “turn and roll the airplane left as if to take off again.” Dr. Chelminski added that the pilot made no announcements, and that there was no communication between them from runway contact to the accident site. He said that in the bank, “it felt as if the plane lost power” but that he couldn’t detect if the engine had stopped."

Photo Supplied by NTSB (Striations are likely the result of the propeller blades contacting the runway)

The dramatic videos show a situation that could have easily been fatal for both the pilot and passenger.

According to local news outlets, the pilot was employed by the airplane operator, UMC Air Operations, and flew doctors and patients to meet various needs.

Questions to be raised include how a 16,000 hour pilot with 2,500 hours in this make and model can get into this situation on an approach when the conditions are day VFR, with an 8-knot wind with no gusts. The crash occurred at the conclusion of a 42-minute IFR flight in VFR conditions after being cleared for a visual approach. No information was provided on how much, if any, flying the pilot had done during the preceding 24 hours. The apparently unstabilized approach, the decision to execute a go-around after the propeller had made multiple contacts with the runway, and the badly botched go-around maneuver raise questions to which we do not have answers.

Editorial note: I believe it would greatly benefit safety if the FAA/NTSB would investigate and examine the human factors involved in a crash, even the non-fatal ones, in which an experienced pilot seems to have made rookie errors.

Lessons to be learned include the importance of making sure the approach is stabilized, being committed to executing a go-around if the approach becomes unstabilized, and knowing the go-around procedure to ensure a safe go-around should it be necessary.

Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.

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