NASA CALLBACK on Non-Towered Airports
Check out the latest issue of NASA CALBACK #548. It provides some excellent reminders on operating more safely when we are on our own without ATC. Click here to see the latest issue.
Another New Edition of "Old Pilot Tips" is Available
Episode #35 in our series reminds us to never take a problem airborne and shares some thoughts on the rejected takeoff. This shorts video is just 43 seconds long. The video is sponsored by Avemco and is narrated by Gene Benson. Click here to check it out.
Free Virtual Safety Presentations Available
As you plan your late fall and winter meetings for your pilot group, consider including a virtual guest speaker. We can provide a safety presentation, valid for Wings credits if you choose, free of charge, courtesy of Avemco. for more information or to schedule, contact gene@genebenson.com. Click here to download a copy of our current presentation catalog.
Syracuse Safety Stand Down
Thanks to all who attended the Syracuse Safety Stand Down on September 6. it was great to meet and chat with many of our subscribers.
When it is Urgent!
Last month in this space we discussed the mechanisms involved in our decision-making processes specifically regarding risk analysis. Our blog feature this month deals with the decisions we need to make as we roll down the runway toward takeoff. In this section we will take a below-the-surface look into the factors affecting the urgent decisions that may be needed.
We begin the takeoff roll and our brain is instantly bombarded with stimuli delivered by all our senses. Our brain draws from our experience background to compare the current stimuli with the expected stimuli. Engine instruments, the airspeed indicator, and the view out the windshield supply visual stimuli while the engine sound, the rolling tires, and the increasing rush of air over the airplane produce audible stimuli. The vibration of the engine and the rolling tires along with the changing control pressures provide tactile stimulation. Our sense of smell is on alert for anything that may be hot or burning, the smell of fuel, or anything else that does not match our expectations.
Any discrepancy is immediately registered and sent for further evaluation and now it can get tricky. Our humanness wants to function as an intermediary and weigh in on the decision to continue or to abort. Continuation bias is always present urging us to continue a task once begun. That momentary hesitation in the engine may be ignored or perhaps not even detected. The unfamiliar sound of the airflow passing over the cabin door that is not firmly latched may also be ignored or go unheard. The unusual vibration in the yoke caused by the elevator trim tab that has come loose may likewise be filtered out. Consequently, a correct decision to reject the takeoff may be overridden or at least delayed until it is too late to reject the takeoff and stop on the runway.
The best remedy to help prevent our humanness from driving an incorrect decision is to build a solid experience background. Unfortunately, practicing more takeoffs in the airplane is not an effective means of accomplishing that. Some level of simulation is necessary and a full-motion simulator with a competent instructor is best. But that is not an option for most GA pilots flying small airplanes. Desktop simulators or even Microsoft Flight Simulator or X-Plane can be effective if used in conjunction with a competent CFI or other experienced pilot. Vibrations, smells other stimuli cannot be simulated in these devices but the CFI or other pilot can simply state “unusual vibration” or “I smell something burning.” This is not substituting the actual stimulus, but it will still enter the experience background. Even armchair flying a takeoff and consciously thinking about anomalies that would be of concern can help.
Simply having an awareness of the situation is a big step forward. To learn more about urgent decision making, please consider taking our free online course sponsored by Avemco. You can even earn Wings credit by completing the short quiz at the end. Click here to visit the course.
REJECT!
Let’s begin by “armchair flying” this scenario. You are beginning a takeoff roll in a familiar airplane on a runway that is adequate for the airplane and the present conditions. You have thoroughly done a preflight inspection and your flight planning. You have calculated that you will need about two-thirds of the runway for your ground roll. There is no significant rising terrain off the departure end, but there is a chain-link fence separating the airport property from a highway about 200 feet beyond the asphalt. The surface between the end of the runway and the fence is turf with a slight downslope. Just a few knots before reaching rotation speed, you hear an unusual noise and feel a slight shudder go through the airplane. Should you reject the takeoff or continue? Remembering that this is one of those urgent decisions that we rarely face, think through the various factors to be considered in your decision. We will come back to this scenario.
The rejected takeoff or RTO is a maneuver that is an important subject in initial and recurrent training for professional flight crews, but not so much for pilots of small, general aviation airplanes. After all, stopping a 3,000-pound airplane travelling at 65 knots is much easier than stopping a 700,000-pound airplane travelling at 130 knots. Or is it?
Obviously, the larger, heavier airplane moving at a higher speed has much more energy to dissipate. But that airplane also has larger wheels, tires, and brakes as well as many more of them. It also has thrust reverse and antiskid capability and is likely to be operating on a very long runway that may have an EMAS barrier at the end. Plus, a speed has been calculated so the pilot can be reasonably assured that the airplane can be stopped on the runway if the takeoff is rejected before that speed is reached.
Our small GA airplane likely lacks most or all those advantages. We may not have a smooth, hard, well-maintained runway surface. Many pilots today learned to drive a car equipped with antiskid brakes and maybe even an electronic stability control system and have never experienced unaided maximum performance braking. And if all does not go well, our barrier might be a fence, trees, an embankment, or a highway.
My discussions with new pilots reveal that most have never experienced a rejected takeoff initiated just below liftoff speed. A ground school discussion is all the majority of new pilots receive. Many CFIs demonstrate the RTO to their students but initiate it at a speed far below liftoff speed. That is understandable due to the excessive wear on the brakes and the slightly increased risk of loss of airplane control at high speed. But even demonstrating a high-speed RTO on a hard, dry, smooth runway may not prepare the pilot for a rejected takeoff on a soft, wet, or rough surface. Since the decision is urgent, the pilot will draw from the experience background for the procedures to follow. If there is an inadequate experience background, there may be an undesirable outcome.
So what can we do? I am a big fan of simulation, but not in this case. Any simulator short of the multimillion-dollar units used by airlines, sufficient fidelity is lacking to simulate the real-world conditions encountered by pilots of small, GA airplanes on many GA runways. It should go without saying that we must know and follow the airplane manufacturer’s procedure for the RTO if one is published.
Of course, prevention is always better than cure. By examining the items that might indicate the need for the RTO, we might take steps to avoid the need for the maneuver. A few reasons to reject a takeoff include: an engine issue, inadequate acceleration, runway incursion, wildlife on the runway, or seat latch issue or anything that just does not seem right. While we can do little to prevent wildlife on the runway or a runway incursion by another pilot, good preflight planning and a thorough preflight inspection can go a long way in preventing the need for the RTO.
The FAA Airplane Flying Handbook in Chapter 6 says, “Prior to takeoff, the pilot should identify a point along the runway at which the airplane should be airborne. If that point is reached and the airplane is not airborne, immediate action should be taken to discontinue the takeoff. When properly planned and executed, the airplane can be stopped on the remaining runway without using extraordinary measures, such as excessive braking that may result in loss of directional control, airplane damage, and/or personal injury.” I have previously written and spoken about creating a “Takeoff Decision Gate” which is essentially the same concept, but, one rule we should always follow is to never take a problem airborne. The RTO from near liftoff speed can be problematic, but it is likely to be the best option if an anomaly is detected during the takeoff roll. Nothing is absolute, but a runway excursion or overrun is usually survivable, while an airborne collision with trees or terrain is frequently fatal.
Just a note of caution: The RTO from even a moderate speed will result in hot brakes. The brakes should be given time to cool before initiating another takeoff. Hot brakes are less effective than cool brakes and the next takeoff might require the RTO.
Let’s go back to our scenario. What factors did you consider in your decision? If proper planning has been done and a Takeoff Decision Gate has been established, the only reasonable decision is to reject the takeoff. What caused the unusual noise and slight shudder in the airplane? You might have just run over a rabbit with a main gear tire, ending the rabbit but otherwise not endangering the flight. Or a gulp of water might just have gone through the fuel system. If so, was it the only water in the system or is a much bigger gulp making its way to the engine? Or did something important, such as a trim tab, just depart the airplane? The source of the noise and shudder does not matter. Something unexpected and unknown has happened, and we do not want to take any problem airborne with us.
What if we are unable to stop on the runway? If we planned properly, we should be able to stop with runway still supporting the airplane. What if our planning was off by a bit and we cannot stop on the runway, given the description of the runway departure end environment, we will have a couple hundred feet of turf, though slightly down sloping, to help reduce our speed with proper braking technique. Even if we reach the chain-link fence, we should be slow enough for it to stop the airplane. The airplane and the fence will be damaged but it is unlikely that anyone will die or be seriously injured.
Contrast that to continuing the takeoff with a serious problem. Experiencing a power loss due to fuel contamination or a control issue due to something coming off the airplane, or any other serious problem that would have produced the strange noise and slight shudder at a low altitude during climb out could have a tragic ending.
Accidents discussed in this section are presented in the hope that pilots can learn from the misfortune of others and perhaps avoid an accident. It is easy to read an accident report and dismiss the cause as carelessness or as a dumb mistake. But let's remember that the accident pilot did not get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I'll go have an accident today." Nearly all pilots believe that they are safe. Honest introspection frequently reveals that on some occasion, we might have traveled down that same accident path.
This rejected takeoff crash happened in Georgia in April of 2021. The airplane was a piper PA-32R-300. The three occupants were all professional pilots and they all escaped injury. The NTSB accident report includes the following: "According to the owner of the airplane, who was the non-flying pilot seated in the right seat, prior to takeoff an engine runup was completed with no anomalies observed, and in addition, the wind sock indicated a calm wind. The owner reported that he and the pilot flying briefed the procedures for a short-field takeoff, back taxied to the end of the runway, and applied the brakes. The pilot flying increased the engine power, released the brakes, and began the takeoff roll. He attempted to rotate; however, the stall warning sounded, and he lowered the nose to accelerate more. The pilot flying again attempted to rotate, the stall warning horn sounded, and at this point the owner took the controls, calling for an aborted takeoff. The owner reduced engine power and applied the brakes; however, the airplane continued off the end of the runway and struck a ditch. A postaccident fire ensued, and the pilots and passenger egressed the airplane without injury. During the accident sequence, the airplane incurred substantial damage to the wings and fuselage."
NTSB Photo
The NTSB report continues, "According to the airplane’s pilot operating handbook, the flaps should be set to the second notch, or 25° for a short field takeoff. After the accident, a Federal Aviation Administration inspector examined the airplane and noted that the flaps were in the first notch, or 10° position. Further, the owner acknowledged that, “…it is possible that the flaps were not set correctly on takeoff.” Given this information, it is likely that the pilot did not properly configure the airplane, which is why the airplane was unable to become airborne during the short field takeoff attempt.”
Berry Hill Airport (Google Earth)
The NTSB probable cause states: "The flying pilot’s failure to configure the flaps for a short field takeoff and delayed decision to abort the takeoff, which resulted in a runway overrun."
NTSB Photo
The lesson learned here does not relate to whether the flaps were correctly set or the flying pilot's technique. The lesson is that a decision was made to reject the takeoff when evidence showed there was a problem. A nice airplane was destroyed, but the three occupants escaped unharmed. Had they become airborne and then stalled, the outcome could have been very different.
Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.
Accidents discussed in this section are presented in the hope that pilots can learn from the misfortune of others and perhaps avoid an accident. It is easy to read an accident report and dismiss the cause as carelessness or as a dumb mistake. But let's remember that the accident pilot did not get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I'll go have an accident today." Nearly all pilots believe that they are safe. Honest introspection frequently reveals that on some occasion, we might have traveled down that same accident path.
The crash of this Beech C23 happened in west Virginia in September of 2021. The 38-year-old, 395-hour, private pilot and his two passenger died in the crash. The NTSB accident report begins with the following: "The pilot and two passengers were departing on the return flight following a weekend of camping. Three witnesses watched as the pilot initiated a takeoff from runway 22 (2,950 ft long), then aborted the takeoff. The pilot continued to the end of the runway, turned the airplane around, and initiated a takeoff from runway 04, which he also aborted. The airplane continued to the departure end of runway 04, turned around, and began another takeoff from runway 22."
NTSB Photo
The NTSB report continues: "One of the witnesses reported that, “…he was going too fast to stop at the end of the runway but not fast enough to take off.” The airplane lifted off “maybe” 800 ft before the departure end of the runway, cleared trees at the departure end, and flew over a creek which ran below and perpendicular to the runway. The terrain on the opposite bank was higher than the runway and included mature trees. The airplane banked steeply left and disappeared below the trees. A witness estimated the airplane’s bank angle as 45° and said that the engine sound was smooth and continuous from engine start until the sound of impact."
NTSB Photo
The NTSB report also includes the following: "Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed no evidence of mechanical malfunctions or anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. The airplane had a useful load of about 862 lbs. The airplane’s weight and balance at the time of the accident was calculated using the known weights of the pilot, passengers, and baggage (a total of about 797 lbs) and estimates of the airplane’s fuel state at the time of the accident based on its likely fuel consumption during the 2.5-hour flight to the accident airport. The amount of fuel onboard at the time of the accident could not be determined; however, the airplane’s weight at the time of the accident would have exceeded its maximum gross weight with a center of gravity aft of the aft limit, even with only about 1 hour of fuel onboard."
NTSB Photo
The NTSB probable cause states "The pilot’s exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack while maneuvering to avoid trees and terrain after takeoff, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and loss of control. Also causal was the pilot’s decision to operate the airplane outside of its weight and balance limitations and his decision to continue the takeoff after two previous aborted takeoffs during which the airplane demonstrated reduced performance."
NTSB Photo
The obvious lesson from this crash is to respect the weight and balance limitations of the airplane. Keeping in line with our rejected takeoff theme, we must not allow continuation bias to dictate our decisions. This pilot ignored obvious signs that the airplane was at its performance limit for the conditions and runway length. Needing to abort a takeoff should make us take a hard look at why we needed to abort. If we can correct the issue, such as setting flaps correctly or some other issue, it is acceptable to make another takeoff attempt. But with no correction available other than offloading weight, a third takeoff attempt shows continuation bias with a bad ending.
Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.
Accidents discussed in this section are presented in the hope that pilots can learn from the misfortune of others and perhaps avoid an accident. It is easy to read an accident report and dismiss the cause as carelessness or as a dumb mistake. But let's remember that the accident pilot did not get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I'll go have an accident today." Nearly all pilots believe that they are safe. Honest introspection frequently reveals that on some occasion, we might have traveled down that same accident path.
This accident happened in Kansas in February of 2021. it involved a Columbia LC42-550FG which was substantially damaged. The 77-year-old, 1200-hour private pilot and his passenger escaped injury. The NTSB accident report includes the following: "The pilot attempted two consecutive takeoffs from opposite runways. Both takeoffs were aborted because the airplane would not lift off from the runway. The pilot reported that the engine and flight controls were operating normally during both takeoff attempts. During the second aborted takeoff, the pilot reported that the brakes “faded,” and the airplane departed the end of the runway and entered a dry grassy area. The pilot then noticed that the left and right main landing gear were on fire; the fire resulted in structural damage to the left wing."
NTSB Photo
The NTSB report continues: "Postaccident examination of the wheel and brake assemblies revealed no mechanical anomalies. Flight control continuity was established from the cockpit to all flight control surfaces, and the airplane was under its maximum gross takeoff weight. Thus, the reason that the airplane did not lift off during the pilot’s two attempted takeoffs could not be determined from the available evidence for this accident.
The fire appeared to originate from the wheel brakes. The time between the two attempted takeoffs was about 15 minutes. The pilot reported that he applied intermittent braking during the first aborted takeoffs. Thus, the brakes likely faded during the second aborted takeoff because they were hot from the consecutive aborted takeoffs and did not have enough time to cool. The fire was most likely caused by the hot wheel brakes entering a dry grassy area after the runway excursion."
NTSB Photo
The NTSB probable cause states: "The pilot’s failure to allow sufficient time for the brakes to cool after a previous aborted takeoff, resulting in a runway excursion during a second aborted takeoff due to degraded braking performance. Contributing to the accident was the contact of the hot brakes with a dry grassy area during the second aborted takeoff."
Hot brakes is an issue on bigger airplanes with written procedures and cooling times calculated based on the speed at which the abort was initiated. We tend to not be concerned about it in small GA airplanes. But as we see here, it can be an issue whether the aborted takeoff was real or for training purposes.
Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.
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