New Episode of "Old Pilot Tips" is Available
The latest episode of our "Old Pilot Tips" series sponsored by Avemco is now available. Episode 24 Addresses the aborted takeoff. This 58-second video addresses reasons why an abort might be wise, selecting an abort point, and safety after the abort. Click here to view it on YouTube.
Featured Video
Thinking about doing some "Leaf-Peeping" this fall? To be safer while enjoying this time of year, check out our video, "Autumn Scenery Safety" sponsored by Avemco. Click here to view the video on YouTube.
Update on the Aging Pilots Project
I am presently surprised by the interest in aging pilots and the associated cognitive skills decline. I hope that we have turned the corner from pilots' reaction to anything related to cognitive skills decline meaning; "They're trying to keep us out of the air." to, "They're finding ways to help us maintain our skills and fly for more years." My webinar, "Combatting Cognitive Decline in Pilots," on Sept. 12 hit the registration limit very quickly, so I scheduled an "overflow" session for Sept. 17. My co-host, Dr. Debra Henneberry from Purdue University, and I enjoyed attentive audiences and active discussion on both sessions. If you missed these sessions, stay tuned. I will be scheduling more live events in the future.
Have a Group of Pilots Age 55 and Over?
My presentation, "Combatting Cognitive Decline in Pilots," might be a good fit for your flying club, EAA Chapter, Civil Air Patrol group, etc. I can provide a no-cost virtual presentation courtesy of Avemco. Wings credit is available. Email me at gene@genebenson.com to discuss scheduling.
For the next several issues of vectors, we will replace the "NASA Callback" feature with a series of articles regarding cognitive decline and what science now tells us about how to combat it. We will make frequent references to pilots, but the information applies to everyone.
Executive Function
Continuing our series on cognition, I want to discuss a bit about Executive Function. This is a set of skills that, simply put, help us get things done. These skills are controlled by the frontal lobe of the brain, and they help us do things such as manage time, pay attention, plan and organize, remember details, and multitask. Executive function also helps us control our impulses and act in a way that is appropriate to the situation.
One of our executive function skills is inhibition. This is the ability to inhibit or control impulsive (or automatic) responses and create more appropriate responses by using attention and reasoning. Inhibition contributes to anticipation, planning, and goal setting. Inhibition blocks behaviors and stops inappropriate automatic reactions, changing one response for a better, more thought-out response adapted to the situation.
For pilots, it allows us to avoid the temptation to do that steep climb and abrupt turn out right after takeoff. It allows us to turn back when dark clouds and lightning are seen ahead.
Another member of our executive function team is working memory. It is a form of short-term memory. It consists of a set of processes that allow us to store and manipulate temporary information and execute complex cognitive tasks including language comprehension, reading, learning, and reasoning. It has limited capacity for storage, storing less than a few elements at a time. In addition to storing these elements, it manipulates and transforms them and it is continually being updated. It allows us to retain the elements that we need to complete a task. It allows us to retain information while our attention is drawn to something else. It allows us to take new information and relate it to previously learned information. It allows us to relate two things that happen in proximity.
A pilot relies heavily on a strong working memory. Multiple stimuli are constantly being presented and must be integrated into meaningful information for processing. Often, new information arrives before the previous information has been completely addressed. Unimportant bits of information must be evaluated and then ignored.
Working memory can be improved by engaging in activities that require the use of working memory such as chess, jigsaw puzzles, Sudoku, games that require remembering rules, and matching games.
A third component of executive function is cognitive shifting. This is the brain's ability to adapt your behavior and thoughts to new, changing, or unexpected events. It is our ability to evaluate our progress on a task, identify what is not working as desired, and devise an alternate course of action. Cognitive shifting or mental shifting is one of our executive functions.
Cognitive shifting is a critical skill for pilots. The pilot needs to recognize that a situation, such as enroute weather has changed and devise an alternate course of action. Other situations requiring change would include an unexpectedly high fuel burn, higher than forecast wind aloft, variable wind gusts causing an unstabilized approach, and more.
Cognitive shifting skills can be improved by playing board games or card games that require strategy. Learning how to do something new or beginning a new hobby can also be helpful.
A third part of executive function is updating. This is the ability to maintain an overview of your actions and behavior as you conduct a task to ensure that it is progressing according to the plan of action. Updating is a part of our executive functions. Updating makes it possible for us to evaluate our actions and behavior to make sure that they are appropriate for the existing situation. It allows us to adjust as circumstances change. Updating works closely with inhibition.
This is a critical skill for pilots. Very few flights progress precisely according to plan. Updating, along with cognitive shifting, allows the changing circumstances to be recognized and the plan to be modified to adjust for the changes.
Updating can be improved by participating in games that rely on short-term memory and require quick switching between tasks. Many action video games fall into this category as do card games that rely on memorizing cards that have been played and planning the next move based on that information.
The final member of our executive function group is planning. It allows us to think about the future and anticipate the steps necessary to complete a task or reach a goal. Planning is the mental process that allows us to select the necessary actions to attain a goal, decide the right order for each task, assign each task to the proper cognitive resources, and construct a plan of action. Planning requires information about the goal and the ability to synthesize the information and mentally construct a course of action. Not everyone plans in the same way. Different people have developed different synaptic paths. Planning can take different routes and still arrive at equally acceptable ideas.
Planning is of course an essential skill for pilots. Constructing a suitable route of flight requires extensive planning. It involves accounting for weather, terrain elevations, airspace considerations, enroute and destination weather, destination and alternate airport suitability, fuel considerations, weight and balance limitations, and much more.
Planning ability can be improved by exercises and games that stimulate the prefrontal cortex. These would include any game that requires memory and planning such as chess, solving arithmetic problems without the use of a calculator, and cooking using an unfamiliar recipe.
I hope you find this series interesting and helpful. I will continue to present more on our cognitive skills next month. Meanwhile, I would suggest that you subscribe to my Being Better mailing list. Click here to subscribe.
Minimum
This article is intended for flight instructors and those who enlist the services of flight instructors. That would include all active pilots since we are required to either complete flight reviews or phases in the Wings program.
The word “minimum” is frequently used in aviation. Here is how Merriam-Webster defines that: “the least quantity assignable, admissible, or possible." We have minimum descent altitude, minimum vectoring altitude, minimum visibility required, and more. When it comes to Part 61, we frequently see minimum standards and that is the “minimum” for discussion here.
Pause for a bit here and ask yourself, “Is my goal to meet the minimum standards for my certification or recent experience requirements, or do I strive to continually improve my proficiency and knowledge as a pilot or CFI? Unfortunately, based on my study of recent crashes, an alternative question would be, “Is my goal to meet minimum standards or do I believe that I am good enough and those rules are for those other, lesser pilots?”
It is undeniable that proficiency in the aircraft and in the operation is the key to safe flying. We need to remember that our proficiency, or lack thereof, impacts not just ourselves. Any risk we accept, whether intentionally or not, also affects our passengers, our families, the families of our passengers, and those on the ground beneath our flight paths.
When a passenger agrees to fly with a pilot, the passenger is putting their future wellbeing and even their life in the hands of that pilot. Most passengers assume that if a pilot is licensed, safety is assured. There is no practical way for a passenger to research the pilot’s level of proficiency. However, if that same passenger was told that surgery, even minor surgery, was needed, they would most likely research the procedure and the surgeon before committing.
I have written before on the subject and I once did a NAFI webinar about how flight instructors are the gatekeepers of safety. A potential passenger places trust in their pilot. Unknowingly, they are also placing trust in the flight instructors who, along the way, have shaped and signed off on the pilot.
So, I encourage all flight instructors to spend a little time on introspection. Honestly evaluate the standards you uphold for the pilots and future pilots whose logbooks you endorse. Remember that the newly certificated or newly rated pilot may never get any better and may even experience some decline from what you see on the day you provide an endorsement. Think about the pilots you have recommended for certificates and ratings in the past year. Think about the flight reviews and instrument proficiency checks you have conducted over the past year. Can you honestly say that you never let someone through your gate whose knowledge or performance was marginal? Can you honestly say that you never let friendship or the promise of a free lunch influence your decision to provide an endorsement? We all know that for certificates and ratings, the pilot must pass the flight test with a designated examiner. But we also know that the examiner will see just a snapshot of the pilot on a particular day. But the flight instructor has seen that pilot over a period of time, through different moods, different stress levels, and in a variety of weather conditions. The system is designed to give the responsibility to the flight instructor with the checkride simply being a second opinion. My system was to, before providing an endorsement of any kind, to ask myself, “Would I let my child go on a flight with this pilot?” The answer to that question determined whether the endorsement was given.
I encourage all those seeking the services of a flight instructor to do a bit of research before making a choice. It may not be as easy as doing an internet search, but asking around the airport for opinions might be enlightening. Keep in mind the phrases like “great guy” or “great girl” might not necessarily indicate “great instructor.” Ask specific questions such as whether a syllabus is used, does the instructor participate in the Wings program, how much experience does the instructor have in the kind of airplane that will be used. Keep in mind that total flight hours, airline experience, or military experience does not guarantee a great instructor. Then, once the decision is made, you have the right to change instructors. If you do not feel comfortable with your CFI for any reason, pull the plug and make a change. It is your money and your life so don’t be reluctant to make a change.
The accidents analyzed below all involve flight instructors. Though the theme of this blog post regards the lasting impact a flight instructor has on their trainees, it is nearly impossible to definitively link substandard instruction to a certificated pilot having a crash after training has been completed. The accidents detailed take a step back in time from that and include crashes that had a CFI onboard.
Accidents discussed in this section are presented in the hope that pilots can learn from the misfortune of others and perhaps avoid an accident. It is easy to read an accident report and dismiss the cause as carelessness or as a dumb mistake. But let's remember that the accident pilot did not get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I'll go have an accident today." Nearly all pilots believe that they are safe. Honest introspection frequently reveals that on some occasion, we might have traveled down that same accident path.
Two young, aspiring pilots died in the crash of a Cessna 152 in Utah on June 24, 2022. The flight was being conducted as part of the Utah State University Professional Aviation Program. The flight instructor, age-24, had an estimated 348.9 flight hours total time with just 2.4 hours in the make and model. The trainee, a commercial pilot and CFI candidate, was age-25 with 252.8 estimated total flight time with 0.4 hours in this make and model. However, the NTSB report indicates that the 0.4 hours was ground operation time only, with the intended flight being cancelled due to weather.
NTSB Photo
The NTSB Report includes the following, "The accident flight was intended to teach the flight instructor candidate how to enter, recognize, and recover from an aggravated stall wherein the airplane follows a corkscrew path. Before the accident maneuver, automatic dependent surveillance - broadcast (ADS-B) data revealed that several training maneuvers were performed with extraordinary directional changes greater than 180° or rapid descents in altitude. The rapid changes in altitude and recovery were consistent with stall or spin recovery maneuvers. Although there were no witnesses to the accident, surveillance video footage captured the airplane descending rapidly in a developed spin. Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed that the airplane impacted terrain in a 45° nose-down attitude, with no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation."
NTSB Photo.
The NTSB report continues, "The operator’s training guidance stated that the minimum altitude to perform spin training was 9,500 ft mean sea level (msl). According to ADS-B data, the accident maneuver was entered about 9,100 ft msl, and the elevation at the wreckage site was 4,590 ft. According to the operator’s flight experience logs, the flight instructor accumulated 2 hours of flight experience learning how to spin the accident airplane. The fight instructors personal flight logs were not provided, and his total flight experience was not determined. According to the operator’s flight experience logs, the flight instructor candidate had no actual flight experience in the accident airplane make and model."
NTSB Graphic
The NTSB probable cause finding states: "The flight instructor’s failure to recover from a developed spin, which resulted in impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident was the flight instructor’s decision to enter the maneuver below the operator’s altitude limitation."
NTSB Video Edited by GB Click here to watch the video
In my opinion, I do not believe that entering the maneuver below the operator's altitude limitation was much if any factor. The operator's stated minimum altitude limitation was 9,500 ft. MSL and ADS-B data showed the airplane to be about 9,100 ft. MSL. After viewing the doorbell video of the crash, it appears to me that the airplane had been in, and continued to be in, a fully developed spin with a very high descent rate. It does not appear to me that another 400 feet of altitude would have allowed a recovery. The crash site elevation was approximately 4,590 ft. For anyone with Cessna 152 experience, you know that climbing to 9,500 ft. MSL can be a bit of a project. It is possible that the CFI decided that 9,100 ft. was sufficient, given the time required to go the last 400 feet.
The larger issue here is whether the CFI had been adequately trained to teach spins. He would have needed a spin endorsement prior to taking his initial CFI checkride. I know from experience that just because a CFI had the spin endorsement, did not guarantee that they were proficient in spin recovery, and certainly did not guarantee that they were competent to teach spins to someone who had never done them. The NTSB report included this: "According to the operator’s flight experience logs, the flight instructor accumulated 2 hours of flight experience learning how to spin the accident airplane. The fight instructor's personal flight logs were not provided, and his total flight experience was not determined. According to the operator’s flight experience logs, the flight instructor candidate had no actual flight experience in the accident airplane make and model."
How much of that two hours of training was spent climbing to 9,500 ft. and then climbing back to 9,500 ft. after each maneuver? Having many years of experience managing and owning flight schools and having personally endorsed 270 CFIs for their initial flight instructor certification, I would never have allowed a CFI with this level of experience to go out to teach spins. This is just my opinion and perhaps I am too "old school." Just my opinion.
Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.
Accidents discussed in this section are presented in the hope that pilots can learn from the misfortune of others and perhaps avoid an accident. It is easy to read an accident report and dismiss the cause as carelessness or as a dumb mistake. But let's remember that the accident pilot did not get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I'll go have an accident today." Nearly all pilots believe that they are safe. Honest introspection frequently reveals that on some occasion, we might have traveled down that same accident path.
The 56-year-old, 9,800-hour CFI and his 70-year-old, 40-hour student were both seriously injured in a crash on the runway in South Portland, Maine. The crash happened on July 8, 2022 at the Portland International Jetport.
NTSB Photo
The NTSB report states, "The student pilot had previously accumulated about 40 total hours of flight experience, but the accident flight with the flight instructor was his first after having not flown for about six years. During the first approach to landing, the flight instructor directed the student to perform a touch-and-go landing. The student pilot stated that he felt “nervous” given the amount of time that had elapsed since he had last flown. The student thought that he subsequently landed the airplane hard and recalled hearing the sound of “crunching metal.” His next recollection was waking up on the runway as the airplane caught fire. The student pilot and the flight instructor were seriously injured and the airplane’s fuselage was substantially damaged during the landing and subsequent postimpact fire. Despite several attempts to contact him, the flight instructor could not be reached following the accident and did not provide a statement about the accident."
The NTSB probable cause finding states: "The student pilot’s improper landing flare, which resulted in a hard landing. Also causal was the flight instructor’s inadequate remedial action."
NTSB Photo
The crash happened on Runway 18, which is 6100 ft. long and 150 ft. wide with a dry surface. The wind was reported to be 170 degrees at 7 knots. The visibility was reported to be 10 miles and the sky had a few clouds at 9500 feet. There was no forecast or reported turbulence.
NTSB Photo
So, what went wrong on this landing? The refusal of the CFI to provide a statement does not help us to understand what happened.
The previously discussed crash regarding spin training as part of a university professional flight program with a low-time instructor/pilot can be contrasted with this crash involving a high-time pilot as the CFI. There is insufficient information to formulate a lesson to be learned. The only thing it tells us is that total flight hours, whether high or low, is not a determining factor regarding CFI competency.
Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.
Accidents discussed in this section are presented in the hope that pilots can learn from the misfortune of others and perhaps avoid an accident. It is easy to read an accident report and dismiss the cause as carelessness or as a dumb mistake. But let's remember that the accident pilot did not get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I'll go have an accident today." Nearly all pilots believe that they are safe. Honest introspection frequently reveals that on some occasion, we might have traveled down that same accident path.
NTSB Photo
This crash should be an eye-opening lesson for all pilots, but especially for flight instructors. A 14,500- hour airline pilot/CFI, with 7 type ratings, age-60, was seriously injured and a 39 year-old student pilot received minor injuries in the crash of a Grumman American AA-1B in Wisconsin. The crash occurred on June 1, 2022.
The NTSB accident report includes the following: "The flight instructor reported that, during the accident flight, he and the student pilot performed two takeoffs and landings and that, on the third takeoff, the engine “quit abruptly” at an altitude of about 150 ft. The flight instructor stated that the engine appeared to have “seized instantly.” The student pilot reported that, during the initial climb after takeoff and when the airplane was about 150 to 200 ft above ground level, the engine “locked up” and lost total power. At that time, the flight instructor assumed control of the airplane and made a forced landing to a vacant field south of the airport, which was straight ahead of the departure runway. The airplane came to rest upright in the field, which resulted in substantial damage to the left outboard wing panel."
The NTSB report continues, "Examination of the airplane at the accident scene found no fuel in the wing fuel tanks. A subsequent examination revealed that the fuel tanks were not breached and that the other fuel system components had no discrepancies. According to the accident report submitted by the flight instructor they departed with 8 gallons of fuel and were flying for about 1 hour and 15 minutes."
The NTSB probable cause states, "The student pilot’s and flight instructor’s inadequate preflight fuel planning, which resulted in a total loss of engine power due to fuel exhaustion."
A statement issued to the FAA by the CFI states that he was not the student's flight instructor. He reported that the student pilot had recently purchased the airplane and that he had been asked to go along on a flight just so that the student could become more familiar with the airplane. The instructor stated that he and the student pilot had reviewed performance, computed weight and balance, verified all required documents, and that the aircraft was in a good maintenance status, and that a pre-flight had been completed. Did the CFI participate in the pre-flight inspection or did he take the word of the pilot/airplane owner? We do not know the answer to that question, but it seems unlikely that the CFI would have agreed to takeoff with just 8 gallons of fuel which would constitute only an hour or less of flight time.
Perhaps there is a lesson to be learned here. A professional pilot is putting their livelihood and reputation on the line and risking their pilot certificate whenever they act as pilot-in-command of an airplane. The FAA and NTSB maintain that, while acting as PIC, the pilot ran out of fuel and crashed. Not a good look to carry forward in a career.
But that is where the lesson can be learned. None of us are immune from human error. A low-time or student pilot asks an experienced pilot to go along for a ride in a newly acquired airplane. A flight instructor might approach that flight differently than if it was a scheduled flight lesson. Certain assumptions might be made regarding several operational issues including fuel quantity. The flight instructor's statement to the FAA stated that a pre-flight was completed. He did not indicate who completed the pre-flight. A reasonable assumption might be that an aircraft owner, even if a student pilot, would verify fuel quantity during a preflight inspection. I point that out, not to let the CFI off the hook, but to explain how this may have happened. That does not excuse failure to verify adequate fuel for the flight before departure nor failure to track fuel consumption and compare expected fuel quantity with fuel gage readings.
Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.
Great Holiday Gift!
"Fifty Years of Flying Insights" by Gene Benson
Paperback version just $12.99 on Amazon (Kindle version also available)
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