NASA "Callback"
The NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) is now fifty years old.. In honor of the anniversary, NASA put out a special edition of "Callback" that explains the origin of the system and some its milestones. Check it out here.
Recommended Viewing: "Turf Runway Essentials"
As we are well into spring and knocking on summer's door, there may be more opportunities (or temptations) to operate from a turn runway. We have a video for that! Click here to see "Turf Runway Essentials" on YouTube.
Situational Awareness: The 20 Second Version
Situational awareness (SA) isn’t just “knowing what’s going on.” It’s your brain constantly building and updating a mental model of the aircraft, environment, and what’s likely to happen next.
Why SA Slips
• Tunnel vision
• Fatigue or stress
• Confirmation bias
Most SA failures come from missed cues, misunderstood cues, or missed predictions.
The Core Skills
Attention • Perception • Working memory • Comprehension • Pattern recognition • Projection • Executive control
How to Boost SA
• Scenario based training
• Quick “What am I seeing/hearing/feeling?” checks
• Kim’s Game recall drills
• Peripheral vision practice
• Solid cross check discipline
• “What if” briefings
Try This
On approach, pause and name:
1. The five most important cues
2. What changed since your last scan
3. The cue that would trigger a go around
Want to learn more about the science behind situational awareness? Check out our "Squawking Human" feature!
The Go-Around: The Best Landing You Never Made
The student pilot is on short final and the instructor says, “I see a deer on the runway. Go around!” The student responds as previously taught and executes the maneuver flawlessly. The instructor issues praise and includes “go-arounds” in the student’s logbook entry and other training records after the flight. This will be repeated, at different stages of the approach and with slightly different scenarios, before the student is endorsed for the checkride. The frequently missing part of training is not how to execute the go-around. It is in making the decision to go-around. All pilots are frequently reminded to go around if anything seems amiss. But this is insufficient. The decision to continue the approach or go around is equally important to the execution of the go-around maneuver.
We need to adjust our mindset to accept the possibility that a go-around might be necessary. Remember that executing a go-around is not a failure on our part or a sign that we are inadequate as a pilot. A precautionary go around demonstrates our maturity as a pilot and our commitment to safety.
That said, anything we can do to reduce the probability that a go-around will be necessary is a good investment of time and effort. Advance planning and deliberately obtaining updates on weather and field conditions at the destination can help to minimize the likelihood of a need to make that decision during any phase of the approach.
Once in range with knowledge of the expected runway and, if IFR, the instrument approach expected, complete the approach briefing checklist. Even if VFR, do a briefing that includes expected runway, its length, obstacles on approach and departure, and the wind speed and the angular difference from the runway heading. Mentally review the stabilized approach criteria and memorize the MSL stabilization altitude.
Once on final and cleared to land, check for key visuals. These would include:
• any unexpected obstacles on or near the runway
• verify the correct runway
• aiming point fixed in one place on the windshield
• PAPI/VASI/glide slope showing in correct glide path
• Threshold and touchdown zone moving toward you at a smooth, constant rate (no “diving” or “ballooning”).
• ensuring the airplane is tracking straight down the centerline, no visible crab angle (longitudinal axis aligned with the direction of travel)
• touchdown will be in the first third of the runway (or a briefed aim point),
• any unexpected condition not briefed
• any unanticipated hazards (airplane or vehicle on or approaching the runway)
Trust your gut. If something does not seem right or look right, it probably is your brain detecting a discrepancy and giving you a gentle nudge. Trust it and go around. If you ever think, “Maybe I should go around,” do it.
However, even though we have adjusted our mindset to be open to executing a go-around, there will be a point at which executing a go-around is more dangerous than continuing the landing. There is no clean, one-size-fits-all “point of no return,” there is a point where an attempted go around becomes more dangerous than accepting an overrun and focusing on crashworthiness and control. In practice, this point is reached when we can no longer reliably restore a safe flying attitude and climb without an extreme risk of loss of control or collision with obstacles. The worst outcome is likely to be loss-of-control or a stall/spin close to the ground. Here are the conditions that constitute the classic setup for LOC-I or stall/spin:
• late go-around
• dirty configuration
• little runway remaining
• possible sideways motion
• obstacles
It might be time to realize, “I’ve let this go too far—what is the least bad option now?” If that conclusion is reached, fly it till it stops – make only small corrections to avoid large objects. Once stopped, follow training and turn off ignition, master, fuel and exit the airplane as briefed.
With good planning and a mindset to go around early if anything is not right, we should never find ourselves in that situation.
Accidents discussed in this section are presented in the hope that pilots can learn from the misfortune of others and perhaps avoid an accident. It is easy to read an accident report and dismiss the cause as carelessness or as a dumb mistake. But let's remember that the accident pilot did not get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I'll go have an accident today." Nearly all pilots believe that they are safe. Honest introspection frequently reveals that on some occasion, we might have traveled down that same accident path.
This mishap happened in June of 2024 and left the 33-year-old private pilot with minor injuries and the Cessna 150 substantially damaged. The NTSB report begins, "The pilot stated that the tailwind for the selected turf runway was “5 to 10 [knots] with some gusting.' He said the winds “did not seem unruly…' so he continued the approach and once he was close to the ground the winds were 'very flukey.' He said with full reduction of throttle, 30° of flaps, and speed slowed to 'landing' the airplane would not 'settle down.' At touchdown, the pilot said he was 'too long.' He then increased throttle, and 'released the flaps and carb heat to go around.”
NTSB Photo
The NTSB report continues, "The pilot said that there were no mechanical deficiencies with the airplane preventing normal operation, it simply did not have the performance capability to outclimb the trees. The pilot said the airplane’s left wing brushed a tree reducing its airspeed, and the stall warning sounded intermittently before the airplane 'careened' into treetops before it settled nose down onto the ground. During the accident sequence, the airplane sustained substantial damage to the wings and empennage."
NTSB Photo Looking down the runway in the direction of takeoff
The NTSB report continues further, "When asked how the accident could have been prevented, the pilot said a go-around performed “sooner” than the touch-and-go landing."
NTSB Photo Banks Airport, Swans Island, Maine
The NTSB probable cause states: "When asked how the accident could have been prevented, the pilot said a go-around performed “sooner” than the touch-and-go landing."
NTSB Supplied Video
The pilot reported having 541 hours total flight time including 405 hours in this make and model. The accident occurred on June 25, 2024 and he reported that his most recent flight review was on October 24, 2020 and his Class 3 Medical Certificate was issued on august 5, 2019.
The precise wind velocity and direction at the accident site is not known, but the nearest weather report from 17 nm away indicated the wind to be 11 kts. from 200 degrees. The runway configuration is 10/28 but the report does not indicate which end was the intended landing runway. Since the probable cause included a downwind landing, the pilot was apparently landing on runway 10.
First lesson learned is, as I have written many times, bad things happen when landing or taking off downwind. The main lesson to be learned is go around early when the approach is unstable.
Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.
Accidents discussed in this section are presented in the hope that pilots can learn from the misfortune of others and perhaps avoid an accident. It is easy to read an accident report and dismiss the cause as carelessness or as a dumb mistake. But let's remember that the accident pilot did not get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I'll go have an accident today." Nearly all pilots believe that they are safe. Honest introspection frequently reveals that on some occasion, we might have traveled down that same accident path.
This crash involved a Cessna 172. It occurred in Pennsylvania in September of 2018. The age-68, commercial pilot and sole occupant escaped uninjured. Unusual for an NTSB report, the pilot's flight hours were not provided. The airplane sustained substantial damage. The NTSB report begins as follows: "During the airplane's first flight after an annual inspection, the commercial pilot practiced touch-and-go landings and then flew the airplane for about 1.5 hours before returning to the airport. While on final approach to land, he reduced the engine power. The pilot stated that after the airplane touched down on the runway, it was traveling too fast to stop before the end of the runway but not fast enough to abort the landing. Subsequently, the airplane continued off the end of the runway, down an embankment, and came to rest inverted about 150 ft from the departure end of the runway. Postaccident examination of the brakes revealed no anomalies, and the pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions or failures of the airplane that would have precluded normal operation. The pilot stated that he lands farther down the runway during full-stop landings because his hangar is at the far end of the runway. Thus, it is likely that the pilot landed the airplane too far down the runway and that it was traveling too fast to prevent a runway overrun."
NTSB Photo
The NTSB probable cause states: "The pilot's decision to land with insufficient runway remaining to stop, which resulted in a runway overrun.."
Somerset County Airport (Google Earth)
The two main lessons to be learned here are first, even when a runway is considerably longer than needed for the airplane and conditions still land in the first third. The pilot said that for full-stop landings, he landed farther down the runway due to the location of his hangar. You can allow the airplane to roll out longer at a higher speed with minimal or no braking after touching down to minimize taxi time but remember that the list of useless things in aviation includes the runway behind you. The second lesson to be learned is from what the pilot did right. He recognized that even though the airplane was going to overrun the runway, he was beyond the point where a safe go-around could be executed and rode it out on the ground. He escaped uninjured, which would not have been the case had he attempted a go-around and stalled while attempting to climb out.
Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.
Accidents discussed in this section are presented in the hope that pilots can learn from the misfortune of others and perhaps avoid an accident. It is easy to read an accident report and dismiss the cause as carelessness or as a dumb mistake. But let's remember that the accident pilot did not get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I'll go have an accident today." Nearly all pilots believe that they are safe. Honest introspection frequently reveals that on some occasion, we might have traveled down that same accident path.
This crash involved a Cirrus SR22 with two people aboard, the pilot and his 15-year-old grand nephew. Both died when the airplane became engulfed in fire during the accident sequence It happened in Iowa in July of 2021. The 54-year-old private pilot had 166 hours total flight time including 45 hours in this make and model.
NTSB Photo
The NTSB accident report includes the following: "The pilot flew a visual approach to the airport, where several witnesses observed the airplane bounce on the runway then heard an increase in engine power, consistent with the pilot’s attempt to initiate a go-around. The airplane banked left, with the left-wing tip striking the ground. It then cartwheeled and impacted the ground to the left of the runway. A postimpact fire ensued, and the pilot and passenger were not able to egress the airplane."
NTSB Photo
The NTSB report also includes: "Postaccident examinations of the airplane revealed no evidence of preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would preclude normal operation. The airplane’s flaps were found in the retracted position. The airplane’s acute left bank during the attempted go-around was consistent with the pilot’s insufficient right rudder control to counter the airplane’s left-turning tendency associated with the increased engine power."
NTSB Photo
The NTSB probable cause states: "The pilot did not maintain aircraft control during an attempted go-around after a bounced landing, which resulted in impact with terrain and a postimpact fire."
NTSB Photo
The NTSB report also includes the following: "The pilot began flying in 2019. On November 4, 2020, the pilot failed a practical examination for a private pilot certificate that required reexamination for the areas of takeoff, landing, go-around, and navigation. On December 28, 2020, the pilot earned a private pilot certificate flying a Cessna 172. On March 28, 2021, the pilot completed transition training for the SR22 that included about 23 hours of flight instruction."
NTSB Photo
What lessons can we learn from this tragedy? The only clear lesson is that proficiency in the go-around maneuver, including the need to compensate for the significant torque produced by a 310-horsepower engine, is critical. The pilot had completed about 23 hours of transition training in the Cirrus SR22, which undoubtedly included practice in go-arounds. We do not know the scenarios that were practiced. The accident flight saw a go-around initiated after a bounce on landing. That would likely have been at a very low airspeed which would have required significant right rudder application to compensate for the sudden significant increase in torque as full power was applied rapidly. If training go-arounds had been demonstrated and practiced only from final approach airspeed, the pilot may not have been prepared for the needed rudder deflection.
Another possible lesson takes us back to the pilot's approach to the runway. Was it stabilized? We do not know for sure, but something caused the bounced landing which led to the pilot's decision to execute the go around. So, whether or not this approach was stabilized, a lesson learned or refreshed is to abort an unstabilized approach and try again.
Click here to download the accident report
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