
Episode 22 of "Old Pilot Tips" is Available!
Episode 22 of "Old Pilot Tips" provides some reminders about making all turns coordinated, especially the turn from base leg to final approach. Some mitigation strategies are provided to prevent this from becoming a potentially deadly turn. Click here to view Episode 22 on YouTube. The "Old Pilot Tips" series is sponsored by Avemco.
Aging Pilots Project
For nearly a year now, I have been working on a project to address the aging pilot question. The objective is to find ways to address cognitive issues in a way to keep pilots safely in the air as they age rather than put them on the ground. See the first posting of our new series just below on cognitive skills. This first post is titled, "We Are All Aging Pilots." Please let me know what you think of the series with an email to gene@genebenson.com.
More on the Aging Pilots Project
Coming soon, either late September or Early October, I will be conducting a number of small group workshops on understanding cognitive skills important to pilots, what each grouping of skills does, and most importantly, how to combat decline in those skills. A workshop schedule, along with registration information will be included in the September 1 issue of Vectors. Meanwhile, I am routinely posting cognitive skills information on my Facebook page. I would suggest following my page for complete information.
Planning an Aviation Event?
If you have an upcoming event and would like to have me deliver one of my presentations, please contact me at gene@genebenon.com. There is no cost for virtual presentations. Please contact me to discuss live, on-site presentations. Click here to download my current presentation catalog.

For the nest several issues of vectors, we will replace the "NASA Callback" feature with a series of articles regarding cognitive decline and what science now tells us about how to combat it. We will make frequent references to pilots, but the information applies to everyone.
We Are All Aging Pilots
There is concern in the GA industry about aging pilots. What exactly is an aging pilot? Can it be defined by age? If so, at what age is a pilot considered to be among the group? Age 50? Age 65, Age 80? What exactly is the concern regarding aging pilots? Is it mobility, eyesight, hearing, or cognitive ability? Most discussion about aging pilots is usually the latter. Let's be realistic before we continue. We are all aging pilots. But there is good news!
It was long thought that cognitive decline was inevitable and irreversible. But just a few decades ago, many of the medical pathologies that are highly treatable today were viewed as incurable. Aided by advanced research tools that were not available just two decades ago, scientists have learned much more about the human brain and how it works. That knowledge includes the concept of brain plasticity or neuroplasticity which shows that through cognitive stimulation, areas of the brain can be made to generate new neuro cells and paths to enhance cognitive performance in the respective areas. Though physiology is different, it can be thought of as exercise or physical therapy for the brain.
Fortunately, there are ways in which we can improve our cognitive skills and functions. The brain is not a muscle, but it shares similar characteristics to our muscles. If we do not exercise our muscles regularly, we begin to lose functionality. If we do not exercise certain aspects of our brain, it will also lose functionality. But like our muscles, these aspects of our brain functionality can be regained through neuroplasticity which is the ability of neural networks in the brain to change through growth and reorganization.
In this series, we will address the main cognitive skills and look at specific, simple ways that we can at least slow cognitive decline, and in some cases, reverse some of what might have been lost. Remember that we are all aging pilots. If you are over age 25, you may already be experiencing cognitive decline. It is usually very gradual, so it is not noticeable. I would recommend anyone over age 40 to follow this series and take the steps recommended. As my grandmother told me many times, an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.

What is your accident worth?
“What is your accident worth?” That is a question asked by a personal injury law firm that advertises heavily on my local TV stations. They are of course talking about motor vehicle accidents and not airplane crashes, but the commercial always annoys me. While Greedy and Greedier (not the actual company name) runs a fine print disclaimer that the people shown are paid actors at the bottom of the screen, several healthy, attractive people are shown, each saying with a big smile, “They got me three million dollars, nine times what the insurance offered.” Each actor has a different dollar amount, but the format is repeated time and again. They make it seem like having a serious motor vehicle accident is tantamount to winning the lottery, but I can just imagine what the actual clients look like. My mind sees people with missing limbs, people in motorized wheelchairs, and permanently residing in nursing homes. I don’t think that a quick visit to the ER earns a seven or eight figure settlement.
So, we can ask the question, “What is your airplane accident worth?” A better question is, What will your airplane accident cost?” I am not looking for an answer that includes a monetary value, though that can be substantial. I am thinking of all the accident reports that I read and follow up on. There are fatalities and serious, often life-changing injuries. Then we must consider the sometimes-devastating impact on the families of those involved in the accident. A spouse loses a partner, a parent loses an offspring, a child loses a parent, a family is financially devastated, and the list goes on.
Let’s be honest. Most of the airplane crashes are preventable. Not all, but many of the serious airplane crashes are caused by someone taking a shortcut. The shortcut sometimes involves deferring necessary airplane maintenance, not adequately flight planning, not adequately maintaining proficiency, and more. Humans are very adept at rationalizing a decision to violate a procedure or regulation that they know exists. Skipping the flight review or finding an “easy” CFI, putting off replacing that sticking fuel selector till the next annual, taking off or continuing in adverse weather when not IFR rated or not meeting recent experience requirements because we must get to that wedding, and much more. And, as I have shown in a recent series of videos, a pilot who deviates from a rule or procedure “Just this Once,” is more likely to deviate again. The process is called normalization of deviance.
Let’s not do that. We all know the rules and the procedures. Yes, we have all deviated from a rule or procedure at some time, and that includes me. It might be less convenient and it might cost a little less. But let’s not find out what our accident will cost.

Accidents discussed in this section are presented in the hope that pilots can learn from the misfortune of others and perhaps avoid an accident. It is easy to read an accident report and dismiss the cause as carelessness or as a dumb mistake. But let's remember that the accident pilot did not get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I'll go have an accident today." Nearly all pilots believe that they are safe. Honest introspection frequently reveals that on some occasion, we might have traveled down that same accident path.
It doesn't matter what we fly, where we fly, what our certificates look like or how fat our logbook is. Lack of adequate aircraft maintenance can make a flight end badly. In this case, a 68-year-old private pilot with single-engine sea rating and an estimated 679 hours total flight time was fatally injured in the crash of her Cessna 180A. The crash occurred on Whiskey Lake near Skwentna, Alaska in September of 2022.

NTSB Photo (Annotations added by GB)
The NTSB Report includes the following, "The pilot was departing on a cross-country flight in a float-equipped airplane when the accident occurred. She had contacted a family member and stated she was departing; however, she did not arrive at the destination when expected. A search was initiated, and the airplane was located partially submerged in the departure lake. Postaccident examination of the wreckage revealed that both floats were heavily corroded and separated from the fuselage. There was no evidence that either float had contacted a foreign object in the water. A portion of the hull on the right float tore open and bent back. It is likely that tear in the float resulted in the airplane impacting the water during the takeoff. Maintenance records were not available for review during the investigation."

NTSB Photo. View of partially separated section on hull of the right float.
The NTSB probable cause finding states, "The failure of the landing gear float due to inadequate maintenance of the floats and corrosion."

NTSB Photo. View of patch and screws on the hull of the right float. (Photo courtesy of Textron)
The NTSB report also includes this, "According to airworthiness records the floats were installed in June 1960. There were no maintenance records available for review."
It seems clear that maintenance was neglected on the floats. Perhaps new floats were needed and they are expensive. News articles and an obituary indicate that the pilot was married with grown children and grandchildren. What was this accident worth? Perhaps more than the cost of new floats.
Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.

Accidents discussed in this section are presented in the hope that pilots can learn from the misfortune of others and perhaps avoid an accident. It is easy to read an accident report and dismiss the cause as carelessness or as a dumb mistake. But let's remember that the accident pilot did not get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I'll go have an accident today." Nearly all pilots believe that they are safe. Honest introspection frequently reveals that on some occasion, we might have traveled down that same accident path.
If the last 100 years of aviation has taught us anything, it is that a poorly maintained airplane is an unsafe airplane. Neglected aircraft maintenance usually is because of either cost or downtime. In the world of FBO rental airplanes and flight schools, those two elements are joined at the hip.
This crash of a Piper Aztec in April of 2021 in Tennessee resulted in serious injuries to the flight instructor and the pilot receiving instruction.

NTSB Photo
The NTSB report states, "The instructor and pilot receiving instruction were conducting multiengine flight training. During takeoff following a simulated engine failure on the runway, the left engine lost power, and the instructor stated that the left propeller would not feather. The airplane descended into terrain past the end of the runway. Witnesses stated that their attention was drawn to the airplane due to its “unusual” sound that was inconsistent with takeoff power. One witness said he could not discern if one engine or both engines were making “continuous sputtering/backfiring” sounds. The airplane climbed to about 100 ft above ground level and the landing gear remained extended until the departure end of the runway. Shortly thereafter, the airplane entered a shallow turn to the left until it disappeared behind a tree line."

NTSB Photo
The NTSB report continues, "Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data revealed that the airplane achieved a groundspeed of 86 knots about midfield and slowed once off the ground. About 200 ft agl, the track depicted a descending, decelerating turn to the left. The radius of the turn tightened until the last target was recorded in the vicinity of the accident site, about ground level, at 59 knots groundspeed. Based on the estimated point at which the takeoff started, the airplane was over 1,400 ft into the takeoff roll when it became airborne. Performance information in the Owner’s Handbook for the airplane indicated a 750-ft takeoff distance. Although ample runway remained on which to safely reject the takeoff, the instructor allowed the pilot to continue the takeoff despite the excessive distance required to become airborne and the loss of left engine power."
We must note here that the instructor's statement says that the reason for the apparently long takeoff roll was that they had practiced one rejected takeoff on the runway before continuing with the normal takeoff. The instructor holds that they were airborne before any power loss issue was noted.

NTSB Photo. Propeller in feathered configuration upon airplane recovery.
Another discrepancy appears to be the flight instructors statement that the propeller on the failed engine would not feather, but the above photo of the engine upon recovery clearly shows the prop in the feathered configuration. Click here to download the instructor's statement.
The NTSB report paints a grim picture of the condition of the accident airplane as follows: "Pilots who had flown the accident airplane during the week before the accident described the left engine either stopping or running roughly with the fuel selector in the left inboard tank position. When the fuel selector was moved to the left outboard tank position, the engine could be restarted, or smooth, continuous operation would be restored. Each said that these power- loss events were reported to maintenance for correction. Three days before the accident, a flight instructor could not start or sustain power on the left engine with the inboard tank selected but started and ran the engine continuously on the outboard tank. He then demonstrated the discrepancy to company maintenance personnel before he rejected the airplane for his scheduled flight."

NTSB Photo. View of Duct Tape Strip Found Loose Inside Left Wing Inboard Fuel Cell (Piper)
The NTSB report continues, "Examination of the wreckage revealed a 12-inch length of duct tape, employed as a “gasket” to seal the loosely fitted left inboard fuel cap, unsecured inside the fuel tank, where it likely blocked the fuel supply port on the accident flight, as it had intermittently during the days before the accident. Examination and testing of the airframe, engines, and components revealed no evidence of any other preimpact anomaly that would have prevented continuous engine power; however, these examinations and a records review revealed numerous examples of maintenance work that was incomplete, inadequate (including the use of duct tape on the left inboard fuel cap), or not performed; the recommended engine and propeller overhauls were more than a decade overdue."

NTSB Photo. View of Duct Tape and Adhesive Residue on Left Inboard Fuel Tank Cap (Piper)
The NTSB probable cause states, "The flight instructor’s failure to abort the takeoff following a loss of left engine power due to fuel starvation. Also causal was the inadequate maintenance of the left fuel cap by unknown maintenance personnel, which resulted in a blockage of the fuel supply from the left-wing tank. Contributing to the accident was the instructor’s failure to maintain airspeed above the one engine-inoperative minimum controllable airspeed after deciding to continue the takeoff."
Regardless of the discrepancies noted between the NTSB report and the instructor's statement, this crash likely would not have happened had the airplane been properly maintained. Aircraft maintenance is expensive, especially when it involves a complex, multiengine airplane. But is the duty of an operator to ensure that the airplanes on the flight line are legal and safe, and to seriously address any reports of problems with any airplane. It is the responsibility of a flight instructor to reject an airplane that has unresolved maintenance issues or that is not in compliance with FAA regulations or manufacturers' specifications for required maintenance. Yes, flight instructors should know how to determine these things based on aircraft logs. Any refusal to share the logs with an instructor or anyone else who is going to act as PIC of the aircraft should be a red flag.
Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.

Accidents discussed in this section are presented in the hope that pilots can learn from the misfortune of others and perhaps avoid an accident. It is easy to read an accident report and dismiss the cause as carelessness or as a dumb mistake. But let's remember that the accident pilot did not get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I'll go have an accident today." Nearly all pilots believe that they are safe. Honest introspection frequently reveals that on some occasion, we might have traveled down that same accident path.

Accident Airplane
This crash of a Mooney M20J in Texas claimed the life of the pilot and his passenger. It happened in June of 2022 in Texas. The 67-year-old private pilot had an estimated 800 total flight hours including 100 hours in this make and model.

NTSB Photo
The NTSB accident report includes the following: "The airplane climbed to about 150 ft agl shortly after takeoff and then began a 180° turn back to the airport. After overflying the departure runway in the opposite direction, the airplane appeared to enter the left downwind traffic pattern to return for landing. As it turned from the downwind to base leg, it rolled left and into the ground. Both the pilot and passenger were fatally injured."

NTSB Graphic
The NTSB report includes discussion as to whether or not the pilot had difficulty in retracting the landing gear after takeoff, but the following statement is included: "Irrespective of the problems the pilot was encountering, he had successfully maneuvered the airplane back to the airport and had the opportunity to land on the opposite runway. Instead, he continued to fly in the traffic pattern at low altitude, and the airplane likely encountered an aerodynamic stall while maneuvering during the base leg."

NTSB Graphic
The NTSB probable cause states, "The pilot’s failure to maintain aircraft control during a base leg turn in the airport traffic pattern, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's lack of recent flight training experience."

NTSB Photo
The statement regarding the pilot's lack of recent training experience in the probable cause finding tells only part of the story. Here is more from the NTSB report: "Multiple flight instructors from the pilot’s base in the Dublin and Stephensville area of Texas were contacted. None stated that they had provided the pilot any recent flight training. One instructor recounted that he had given the pilot initial training in 2001 through to his first solo flight. He reported that the pilot was stubborn and often refused to use his checklist. The instructor was made aware that shortly after receiving his solo endorsement the pilot was flying passengers while still a student. When he approached the pilot to discuss, the pilot stated that he no longer wanted to use him as an instructor. The pilot reportedly found another instructor to complete his training." The FAA describes hazardous attitudes of pilots in several publications. Perhaps this pilot exhibited some of that.
And there is more: "Burnt remnants of the pilot’s logbooks were found in the wreckage. Thermal damage prevented an accurate assessment of total flight time; however, the endorsement pages were largely intact. The last endorsement was dated August 11, 2004, and was for a 14 CFR 61.56 flight review. A friend, who was also a pilot and had flown with him, stated that he was generally procedure oriented, and on occasion was overcome by operational tasks and could sometimes “get behind” the airplane."
Unfortunately, there is still more: "The pilot’s medical certificate had expired almost 19 years before the accident." The states that there is no evidence that the pilot had operated under Basic Med. The report includes information that indicates the pilot likely would not have qualified for a medical certificate, and perhaps not Basic Med.
Perhaps we see evidence of the slippery slope of proficiency non-compliance. The pilot perhaps knew that he would not qualify medically to fly so just skipped the medical certification. Now, with an expired medical certificate, he was due for a flight review. But the instructor conducting the flight review might ask to see the pilot's medical certificate, so the flight reviews were skipped also.
The NTSB report is quite lengthy on this crash and there is interesting background information in the docked. For those interested in looking deeper into this crash, I would encourage following the link provided to the docket from which other documents can be accessed.
I feel compelled to make an editorial comment on this crash. The NTSB report included an isolated sentence, "The passenger was a recent acquaintance of the pilot and did not hold a pilot certificate." This is an example of what drives me to do the safety work that I do. When a pilot acts irresponsibly, other lives are put at risk. It seems unlikely that the pilot disclosed to his "recent acquaintance" that he had not flown recently, that he did not meet the FAA medical requirements to act as pilot-in-command, that he did not meet FAA recent experience to carry a passenger, or that he had not completed recurrent training required every two years in more than eighteen years. We do not know what family his unsuspecting passenger might have left behind. Sad and unnecessary! End of rant.
Not subscribed to Vectors for Safety yet? Click here to subscribe for free!