Back by Popular Demand
"Pilot Performance - Enhancing the Most Important System in the Aircraft" will be presented live one more time. The webinar will be hosted by Gene Benson with guest presenters Tammy Barlette and Lashea Bacon, both experts in their respective fields. We will go live at 9:00 PM EST on Tuesday, March 4, 2025. Click here for more information and to register.
Syracuse Safety Stand Down
March 29, 2025 is the date for this year's Syracuse Safety Stand Down. This all-day event will take place in the large conference room at Syracuse-Hancock International Airport (KSYR). This very popular annual event features several presenters, including Gene Benson and David St. George, free lunch, and door prizes courtesy of Avemco Insurance. Complete details have not been published yet so please save the date and search FAASafety.gov for "seminars" around the middle of March.
Another New Edition of "Old Pilot Tips" is Available
Episode #28 in our series explains, in less than one minute, a tip to help ensure that the landing gear and flaps are positioned as you intend them to be. Click here to check out "One Finger"
Recommended Online Courses
In keeping with our theme of landings for this quarter, our free online course, Caution! Wake Turbulence" is recommended. It presents some valuable reminders that wake turbulence is a very real danger and reviews the procedures to help avoid flying into it. Completion of the brief course is valid for 1/2 Credit for Basic Knowledge Topic-3. Click here to visit the course. And of course, our newest course "Psychology of Approach and Landing" is still available and valid for 2 Wings credits. Click here to visit that course.
Now Offering a Full-Day Landings Workshop
Delivered either virtually or on-site, this in-depth program delves deep into making better and safer landings. Valid for 5 FAA Wings credits, this program can benefit pilots of all certification and experience levels. For more information or to schedule the workshop for your group or organization, click here or email gene@genebenson.com.
Virtual Presentations for any Size Group Available for Free!
Flying Clubs, Pilot Associations, CAP, QB, 99s, FBOs, Flight Schools can all have no-cost virtual presentations courtesy of Avemco. Wings credit is available for all presentations. Virtual presentations can attended by members of your group wherever they may be, can be projected to a group at a central facility, or both simultaneously. Click here to download my updated presentation catalog. Email me at gene@genebenson.com for questions or to discuss scheduling.
Processing Speed
A pilot is on a night, VFR approach to a non-towered airport. A cold front is approaching the airport but except for a few high clouds and a bit of a gusty wind, it should be a routine approach. The pilot has completed a silent approach briefing, a review of the go-around procedures, and made note of the selected stabilization altitude as the airplane lines up with the runway on a three-mile final. Full flaps are added and a final GUMPS check is made to verify that the airplane is properly configured for landing.
The pilot notes that the VASI is showing that the airplane is a bit below the glideslope so a bit of power is added to maintain altitude until the red and white indication is observed confirming that the airplane is now on the glideslope. The pilot reduces power a bit to follow the descent profile of the VASI. After a few seconds, the VASI indication shows that the airplane is slightly above the glideslope. The pilot reduces power a bit more to correct back to the glideslope. A few more seconds pass and the airplane is slightly above the glidepath. The pilot notes that the amount of power being used is somewhat less than what is usually required. As the pilot processes this fact, the VASI indication changes to show that the airplane has returned to the glidepath. The pilot adds a bit of power to maintain the descent rate but sees that the VASI is now giving a slightly below glideslope indication. Just as the pilot advances the throttle a bit more, the VASI appears to be screaming that the airplane is well below the glideslope by showing four bright red lights. The pilot responds by pushing the throttle forward to add a few hundred more RPMs. The pilot attempts to process the information provided by the VASI and remembers that if an approach becomes unstabilized below the stabilization altitude, a go-around needs to be executed. A quick glance at the altimeter shows that the airplane has descended four hundred feet below the selected stabilization altitude. As the pilot is processing all this information, a decision is made to execute a go-around, but just as power is being applied, the sound of scraping, metal bending, is accompanied by a feeling of rapid deceleration and spinning fills the pilot’s senses.
This pilot appears to have done everything right, yet the airplane is substantially damaged after landing short of the runway. The pilot rehearsed the go-around procedure, did a silent approach briefing, understood the stabilized approach concept and had set a stabilization altitude. Yet, the airplane descended well below the stabilization altitude while clearly the approach was not stabilized. Why? In this fictional, but realistic scenario, the pilot was not processing the information being sent to the brain rapidly enough. The pilot was figuratively a hundred yards behind the airplane when ground contact was made.
Like other cognitive skills, processing speed degrades over time if we do not exercise it. Even if we have allowed degradation to occur, it can be restored thanks to neuroplasticity as we discussed regarding divided attention.
Improve Processing Speed
Processing speed may be improved by doing just about any sorting activity that is timed. Some examples are to take a deck of cards, shuffle or mix up the cards, and sort them by suit as quickly as possible. Time the activity and repeat it several times per day, each time trying to complete the task in less time than before. A variation is to sort the cards by suit and by number. If you have a Scrabble® game, see how quickly you can sort the tiles by letter. Time and repeat several times each day.
Reverse order activities can also help improve processing speed. Time how rapidly you can recite backwards the days of the week, months of the year, or the alphabet. Again, time and repeat. Scrambled word puzzles worked rapidly are also good.
Be creative. Any activity that forces you to think quickly is beneficial to maintaining or improving cognitive processing speed. The key is to perform the activity several times each day for at least fifteen minutes each time.
Click here to download the free "Aging Pilot Report."
Go-Arounds are More than Knowing the Procedure
I would guess that an instructor or more experienced pilot has told every pilot, “If anything does not seem right on the approach, execute a go-around.” I know that all my students have been told that more than once each. Yet, bad landings break airplanes but rarely kill people while go-around accidents have a high rate of lethality. So, I want to dive a little deeper into the go-around maneuver.
I frequently remind pilots to know the go-around procedure recommended for their airplane and to mentally review it when in-range of the destination airport and again when on downwind leg. I stand by that advice, but it does not go far enough. Knowing and following the procedure is essential, but there is more involved in safely executing a go-around.
Mindset is important. In my human factors work, I frequently address the concept of expectancy. In many things we do, especially things we do rather frequently, we develop a mindset of expectancy in which our brains expect a specific result. Couple that with our continuation bias and we tend to forge on ignoring any warning signs along the way. Not as easy as it seems but try to switch that expectancy to executing a go-around maneuver rather than a landing. That mindset will help to allow evidence of negative reasons toward continuing the approach to get through.
The right mindset can enable us to avoid a delayed decision to go around. The earlier a go-around decision is made, the more likely it will succeed. For an airplane making an approach at 70 knots groundspeed and a descent rate of 500 fpm, a 3-second delay results in traveling an additional 354 feet forward and 25 feet down. A 5-second delay produces 590 feet forward and 42 feet down while an 8-second delay will give us an additional 944 feet forward and 66 feet down. Every foot we travel forward puts us one foot closer to obstacles or terrain off the departure end of the runway. Every foot we descend is one foot that we will need to climb back through to clear those obstacles and terrain.
Careful preflight planning is necessary to allow us to have options as we near our destination airport. A very important option is the one to divert to an alternate airport if the weather is not as planned or a main runway is closed and a less desirable runway is all that is available. Planning to have adequate fuel available and pilot and passengers’ physiological needs met gives us that option.
Planning for a successful go-around is just as important as planning for a successful landing. A close look at the airport environment can reveal potential issues. Consider obstacles and terrain off the departure end of any runways that might be used for your intended landing. Assuming a landing into the wind is being made, rising terrain off the departure end of the runway may produce substantial downdrafts. Any delayed decision to abort the landing might take the airplane close to the terrain and into the downdrafts. An attempt to climb by increasing pitch attitude or an attempted turn away from the terrain can lead to an unintentional stall. Likewise, a body of water off the departure end of the runway can produce downdrafts if the water is substantially cooler than the surrounding terrain. Think about a hot, sunny summer afternoon in late spring. Passing over the water and encountering a downdraft while low and slow might present two undesirable options, fly into the water or stall trying to avoid flying into the water.
Back to knowing the recommended procedure for the go-around, the fact still holds that we must know the specific procedure for the airplane we are flying on this flight. When should the flaps be retracted and by how much? Should the landing gear be retracted upon attaining a positive rate of climb or after clearing all obstacles? What is Vx and Vy for this airplane? These facts and more are not aviation trivia. Knowledge is power and on a go-around maneuver, we need that power in addition to all our engine power.
Accidents discussed in this section are presented in the hope that pilots can learn from the misfortune of others and perhaps avoid an accident. It is easy to read an accident report and dismiss the cause as carelessness or as a dumb mistake. But let's remember that the accident pilot did not get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I'll go have an accident today." Nearly all pilots believe that they are safe. Honest introspection frequently reveals that on some occasion, we might have traveled down that same accident path.
The 33-year-old, 757-hour commercial pilot and sole occupant of the Cessna 172M escaped injury when the airplane stalled and crashed during a go-around attempt. The crash happened in Texas in May 2024. The NTSB report includes the following: "The pilot reported he was landing the airplane when a strong gust of wind pushed the airplane to the right about halfway down the runway. The pilot reported that after he initiated a go-around, the airplane became uncontrollable which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and impact with the ground. The impact resulted in substantial damage to the left wing and fuselage."
NTSB Photo
The NTSB report continues: "Initially the pilot reported that there were no mechanical malfunctions related to the airplane so the airplane was released to the owner. Later, the pilot reported that he did not hear the stall horn and suspected it was inoperable. He also stated that the flap switch physically stuck in the up position which retracted the flaps fully and contributed to the stall.
The pilot was asked to describe the normal operation of the flap switch. He stated that holding the switch up raises the flaps, holding the switch down lowers the flaps, and letting go of the switch shuts off the flap motor.
When follow up was conducted on the reported mechanical issues, the airplane was found stripped of parts, thus examination of the stall horn was not possible. The flap switch was removed and examined."
NTSB Photo.
And the NTSB report continues further: "The flap switch specifications and the Pilot Operating Handbook both stated that the switch would remain in the up position until the switch was physically moved to the center (off) position, thus if the pilot let go of the switch while raising the flaps, the switch would stay in the up position and continue to raise the flaps to zero. During a go around, the flaps should have initially been retracted to 20 degrees which would require the pilot to move the flap switch back to the neutral position after the flaps reached 20 degrees. After the airplane was established in a climb, the remaining flaps would be retracted by returning the flap switch to the up position.
The switch was found to operate normally with no defects found. Based on the pilot’s description of the flap switch operation it is likely he did not know how the switch functioned."
The NTSB probable cause finding states, "The pilot’s failure to maintain airplane control during a go-around in a gusting crosswind, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and collision with terrain. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s lack of system knowledge regarding the operation of the flaps."
Knowing how the systems in any airplane we fly is essential.
But this is a bit more involved. Not to give the pilot a pass, but different models of The Cessna 172 utilized different functions regarding the flap switch. The NTSB is correct in stating how the flap switch operated in this Cessna 172M. In fact, there are Cessna 172s out there in which the flap switch operates as the pilot described. Some flight schools operate a mix of Cessna 172 models providing a mix of operating characteristics for the flaps.
There is mitigation for this trap, and I believe for safe operation overall. Regardless of what kind of airplane I am flying, I always keep my hand on the flap switch and monitor the flap position as they extend or retract. I do not remove my hand from the switch until the flaps have reached the setting I want. I do the same for the landing gear. Yes, there may be some rare instance in which my hand must be used to do something else but I make a habit of returning my hand to the flap or gear switch and verify flap or gear position as soon as possible.
Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.
Accidents discussed in this section are presented in the hope that pilots can learn from the misfortune of others and perhaps avoid an accident. It is easy to read an accident report and dismiss the cause as carelessness or as a dumb mistake. But let's remember that the accident pilot did not get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I'll go have an accident today." Nearly all pilots believe that they are safe. Honest introspection frequently reveals that on some occasion, we might have traveled down that same accident path.
The NTSB accident report includes the following, "The pilot was flying the experimental amateur-built airplane in the airport traffic pattern. After completing two low approaches to the runway, the pilot was approaching the runway for a third time and had been cleared by the air traffic controller to land. The pilot reported that while on short final approach, he encountered a large number of birds and elected to perform a go around to the left of the runway; however, the airplane did not climb as the pilot expected and collided with trees short of the runway. The air traffic controller described that while the accident airplane was on final approach, at an altitude about 20 ft above the runway, it abruptly turned 45° left and appeared 'out of control.' The airplane subsequently began to climb before it turned hard left and descended in a nose down attitude into the trees."
NTSB Photo
The NTSB report continues, "The pilot had accrued 490 total hours of flight experience, of which 1 hour was in the accident airplane make and model. The owner of the airplane stated that the pilot was attempting to build flight experience to meet the requirements of an airline transport pilot certificate. The owner agreed to let him fly the airplane, but required the pilot to fly with a flight instructor due to his lack of experience in the airplane make and model. The pilot did not follow the owner’s instructions and was flying solo at the time of the accident."The NTSB Probable Cause states, "The pilot’s failure to maintain aircraft control and his exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and spin during an attempted go-around."
Perhaps the pilot reacted to a startle event, the birds, and increased the angle of attack while entering a turn. This appears to be an example of a classic departure stall. The lack of experience in this airplane is certainly a causal factor. The lesson to be learned here is that advanced pilot certificates do not alter the laws of aeronautics.
Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.
Accidents discussed in this section are presented in the hope that pilots can learn from the misfortune of others and perhaps avoid an accident. It is easy to read an accident report and dismiss the cause as carelessness or as a dumb mistake. But let's remember that the accident pilot did not get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I'll go have an accident today." Nearly all pilots believe that they are safe. Honest introspection frequently reveals that on some occasion, we might have traveled down that same accident path.
Fortunately, the pilot and sole occupant received only minor injuries in this crash the happened during a go-around attempt. The light sport airplane was a Flight Design GMBH CTSW and the 31-year-old private pilot who had logged 182 hours total flight time with 38 hours in the make and model.
The analysis section of the NTSB report states, "After an uneventful cross-country flight, the pilot checked the weather and then set up for a straight in approach for his destination airport. On final, the airplane floated in ground effect over the runway and the airplane touched down flat with minimal flare. During rollout, within a moment of having 3 wheels on the ground, a large gust of wind picked up the airplane’s right wing and turned the airplane toward some trees on the side of the runway. The pilot was not able to correct the turn, so he added power and executed a go-around. The pilot attempted to clear trees beyond the departure end of the runway, and the airplane stalled. The airplane descended and impacted into a lake adjacent to the end of the runway. The airplane sustained substantial damage to the composite firewall. A crosswind component of 15 knots and wind gusts of 23 knots were reported about the time of the accident. After the accident, the pilot stated that he should have diverted to another airport due to the combination of wind, gusts, and obstacles adjacent to the runway."
NTSB Photo showing airplane after recovery
The NTSB probable cause finding states, "The pilot’s failure to maintain sufficient airspeed during a go-around, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and impact with water. Contributing to the accident were crosswind gusts."
NTSB Phots showing damage to the firewall
In the Recommendation Section of the NTSB Pilot-Operator Report, the pilot states, "If I had known beforehand that there would be a large crosswind gust possibility I would have diverted to KDTO. Given the weather I had retrieved, I wasn't expecting any such gusts. In hindsight I feel like my only two options were to hit the trees or attempt an aborted landing. Going forward I probably won't land a light aircraft on the paved runway at Lakeview again. The combination of obstacles on each side of the runway and the tree line being so close to the paved surface leaves little room for pilot error, mechanical failure, or weather related problems."
This crash perhaps illustrates continuation bias which is a human tendency to want to complete a task once it has begun. This tendency gains strength as we near the end of the task. The pilot reported that the last departure point was Longmont, Colorado. The straight-line distance is nearly 700 nm which at a no-wind cruising speed of 115 knots would require about 6 hours. The pilot reported leaving Longmont at 7:24 AM Mountain Time and the stated time of the crash is 2:13 PM Central time. That would mean the airplane would have been in the air just a few minutes less than 6 hours. That raises the possibility that the pilot was tired, had a pressing physiological need to be on the ground, or that the fuel was getting low making a diversion to a different airport questionable. All this might be supported by the fact that the pilot made a straight-in approach to Runway 18 rather than flying a standard traffic pattern. Flying a standard pattern would have allowed him to better judge the wind and to observe the runway environment.
Google Earth view of Airport annotated by GB
Video of the crash (Source NTSB annotated by GB)
Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.
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