Episode 20 of "Old Pilot Tips" is Available!
Episode 20 of "Old Pilot Tips "provides a reminder to make sure that the engine primer is locked before takeoff. Click here to view Episode 20 on YouTube. The "Old Pilot Tips" series is sponsored by Avemco.
Be Safer this Summer!
We have a program for that! Avoiding the Summer Flight "Gotchas" addresses some of the specific additional hazards that are presented during the summer. Complete the free online course and associated quiz to earn two Wings credits, Basic Knowledge Topic 2 and Advanced Knowledge Topic 2. Click here to enroll in the course on "Skillfull."
Propeller Blade Safety Alert
The NTSB has issued a Safety Alert regarding aluminum propeller blades. The alert is worth the read since a blade fracture can be catastrophic. Click here to see it on the NTSB website.
Upcoming Live In-Person and Virtual Events
On Saturday, June 1, I will present "Combatting Mental Inertia" to the spring meeting of the NY-NJ 99's in Binghamton, NY.
On Thursday, June 13, I will present (virtually) "Help! My Brain is Trying to Kill Me" to the Shelby County (Alabama) Pilots Association. The event is open to the public so if you are in range, click here for more info or to register.
Thanks to Avemco Insurance for sponsoring all of my live presentations and for providing some very nice giveaway items for attendees at in-person events.
Planning an Aviation Event?
I have updated my presentation equipment and am open to conducting both live, on-site and virtual events. If you have an upcoming event and would like to have me deliver one of my presentations, please contact me at gene@genebenon.com. Click here to download my current presentation catalog.
The following is reprinted from the May 2018 Issue 460 of the NASA CALLBACK series.
A Man and His Mooney
A Mooney 201 pilot altered a procedure and expected no adverse consequences. The technique was not thought through carefully or mentioned to the other pilot, and the unmitigated risk produced a less than desirable outcome.
■ I was flying chase support for an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV).… [We] were chasing a UAV capable of very slow flight. In order to stay in position, our airspeed, with full flaps and low power, was staying at the stall speed of the aircraft. As a result, the stall warning horn was frequently and sometimes continuously sounding. It made communication with the ground-based pilots of the UAV and ATC difficult.
Processing Speed
A pilot is on a night, VFR approach to a non-towered airport. A cold front is approaching the airport but except for a few high clouds and a bit of a gusty wind, it should be a routine approach. The pilot has completed a silent approach briefing, a review of the go-around procedures, and made note of the selected stabilization altitude as the airplane lines up with the runway on a three-mile final. Full flaps are added and a final GUMPS check is made to verify that the airplane is properly configured for landing.
The pilot notes that the VASI is showing that the airplane is a bit below the glideslope so a bit of power is added to maintain altitude until the red and white indication is observed confirming that the airplane is now on the glideslope. The pilot reduces power a bit to follow the descent profile of the VASI. After a few seconds, the VASI indication shows that the airplane is slightly above the glideslope. The pilot reduces power a bit more to correct back to the glideslope. A few more seconds pass and the airplane is slightly above the glidepath. The pilot notes that the amount of power being used is somewhat less than what is usually required. As the pilot processes this fact, the VASI indication changes to show that the airplane has returned to the glidepath. The pilot adds a bit of power to maintain the descent rate but sees that the VASI is now giving a slightly below glideslope indication. Just as the pilot advances the throttle a bit more, the VASI appears to be screaming that the airplane is well below the glideslope by showing four bright red lights. The pilot responds by pushing the throttle forward to add a few hundred more RPMs. The pilot attempts to process the information provided by the VASI and remembers that if an approach becomes unstabilized below the stabilization altitude, a go-around needs to be executed. A quick glance at the altimeter shows that the airplane has descended four hundred feet below the selected stabilization altitude. As the pilot is processing all this information, a decision is made to execute a go-around, but just as power is being applied, the sound of scraping, metal bending, is accompanied by a feeling of rapid deceleration and spinning fills the pilot’s senses.
This pilot appears to have done everything right, yet the airplane is substantially damaged after landing short of the runway. The pilot rehearsed the go-around procedure, did a silent approach briefing, understood the stabilized approach concept and had set a stabilization altitude. Yet, the airplane descended well below the stabilization altitude while clearly the approach was not stabilized. Why? In this fictional, but realistic scenario, the pilot was not processing the information being sent to the brain rapidly enough. The pilot was figuratively a hundred yards behind the airplane when ground contact was made.
Like other cognitive skills, processing speed degrades over time if we do not exercise it. Even if we have allowed degradation to occur, it can be restored thanks to neuroplasticity as we discussed regarding divided attention. The following are a few activities to help preserve or restore cognitive processing speed.
Do just about any sorting activity that is timed. Some examples are to take a deck of cards, shuffle or mix up the cards, and sort them by suit as quickly as possible. Time the activity and repeat it several times per day, each time trying to complete the task in less time than before. A variation is to sort the cards by suit and by number. If you have a Scrabble® game, see how quickly you can sort the tiles by letter. Time and repeat several times each day.
Reverse order activities can also help improve processing speed. Time how rapidly you can recite backwards the days of the week, months of the year, or the alphabet. Again, time and repeat. Scrambled word puzzles worked rapidly are also good.
Be creative. Any activity that forces you to think quickly is beneficial to maintaining or improving cognitive processing speed. The key is to perform the activity several times each day for at least fifteen minutes each time.
Good cognitive processing speed is critical to flying, driving, and many other activities. Taking time to maintain and improve our cognitive skills is just as important as taking time for physical exercise.
Going back to our fictitious scenario, you probably already determined that low level wind shear was the cause of the airplane's misbehavior. To learn more about wind shear, click here to download an excellent FAA publication on the subject.
Accidents discussed in this section are presented in the hope that pilots can learn from the misfortune of others and perhaps avoid an accident. It is easy to read an accident report and dismiss the cause as carelessness or as a dumb mistake. But let's remember that the accident pilot did not get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I'll go have an accident today." Nearly all pilots believe that they are safe. Honest introspection frequently reveals that on some occasion, we might have traveled down that same accident path.
Three people in the crash of a Beech V35 in California. The crash occurred in July 2021. The NTSB report lists the three people killed as the left seat pilot, a private pilot age 73 with 2,278 hours (estimated), a right seat pilot-rated passenger, age 37, and a rear seat passenger with no age listed. The report indicates that the right seat passenger was a private pilot with 27 hours total flight time. The number of flight hours is clearly in error since the minimum flight hours to earn a private pilot certificate is 40. News sources indicate that the two front seat pilots were father and daughter while the backseat passenger was the daughter's husband. The right seat pilot was a veterinarian. Sadly, the couple had a one-year-old son who was at home with the daughter's mother.
NTSB Photo
The NTSB report includes the following narrative of the event: "On July 16, 2021, about 0840 Pacific daylight time (PDT), a Beechcraft V35B, N112TW, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Angwin Airport-Parrett Field (2O3), Angwin, California. The pilot, pilot-rated passenger, and one passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. Radar track data identified the accident airplane departing from French Valley Airport (F70), Murrieta, California, on a climbing southwest heading. The data showed that the airplane made a climbing left turn to the northwest to an altitude of about 9,000 ft msl and continued at that altitude for most of the flight. A little over two hours later, the radar track data showed the airplane descending from 9,000 ft msl as it entered a left downwind for runway 16 at 2O3. The radar track data showed that the airplane made a wide left base turn to final and overshot the final approach. The radar track data then showed the airplane reacquiring the runway heading and landing."
NTSB Graphic
The NTSB report continues, "Witnesses at 2O3 reported that the airplane cleared the first tree line at the departure end of the runway. One witness reported that, after clearing the first set of trees, the airplane began to pitch up, the left wing dropped, and the nose then dropped toward the ground. The witness lost sight of the airplane behind a hill but saw smoke shortly afterward. Witnesses at 2O3 reported that the airplane cleared the first tree line at the departure end of the runway. One witness reported that, after clearing the first set of trees, the airplane began to pitch up, the left wing dropped, and the nose then dropped toward the ground. The witness lost sight of the airplane behind a hill but saw smoke shortly afterward."
NTSB Photo
The airplane was equipped with a throw-over-type control column for elevator and aileron control. Figure 1 provides the description of the control column in the Beechcraft Bonanza V35, V35A, and V35B POH.
The analysis section of the report states: "The airplane departed with visual meteorological conditions for a daytime cross-country flight. Flight track information showed the airplane descending from 9,000 ft mean sea level (msl) and entering the left downwind leg for runway 16 at the destination airport. The flight track showed a wide left base turn to final that overshot the final approach course. The airplane then reacquired the runway heading and landed. A video recording device was installed on the accident airplane, which captured the entire flight along with audio. The video showed that although the left-seat pilot was controlling the airplane during most of the cross-country portion of the flight, once the flight neared the destination airport the airplane’s throw-over yoke was moved to the right-seat pilot (the pilot), who then controlled the airplane for the rest of the flight. The pilot descended the airplane, and it entered the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern for the runway. The left base turn was then rounded to a turn to the final approach leg. The video shows that the airplane had entered a left bank of about 30°, the airspeed indicator displayed about 150 mph, and the altitude was 3,000 ft msl (1,125 feet above ground level [agl]). Throughout the approach, the pilot manipulated the yoke with both hands and attempted to correct the airplane’s flightpath toward the runway centerline. The pilot appeared to have decreased the power setting significantly as the airplane approached the runway. The video then showed the airplane crossing the runway threshold with the altimeter indicating 1,850 ft msl and the airspeed indicator showing about 100 mph. According to the airplane’s Pilot’s Operating Handbook (POH), the final approach speed should be 81 mph at the airplane’s maximum gross weight. After a hard landing, the airplane entered a series of bounces that were consistent with porpoising. Each bounce led to an increase in the airplane’s pitch angle. The left-seat pilot stated, “go around,” and the pilot applied throttle. The airplane impacted the runway again and entered another bounce. The airspeed indicator showed about 60 mph, and the pilot applied a positive pitch attitude to abort the landing. The airplane pitched nose-up sharply and remained in a nose-high attitude until it impacted a 50-ft-tall tree about 0.5 miles south of the departure end of the runway, where a postcrash fire ensued. One witness on the ramp near the departure end of the airport reported that, after clearing trees in a low spot near the airport, the airplane continued over a vineyard and then began to pitch up, the left wing dropped, and the nose then dropped toward the ground; the witness identified the airplane as having entered a stall. The witness lost sight of the airplane behind a hill but saw smoke shortly afterward."
The NTSB probable cause finding states, "The pilot's exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack during an aborted landing after an unstabilized approach and hard landing, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and impact with trees and terrain. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s decision to continue the unstabilized approach."
All we can say about this tragedy is what we have said many times before. Know and review the go-around procedure before beginning an approach. The stabilized approach is the key to a successful landing. Set a stabilization altitude well above the airport elevation. If the approach is not stabilized when descending through that altitude, execute a go-around immediately.
Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.
Accidents discussed in this section are presented in the hope that pilots can learn from the misfortune of others and perhaps avoid an accident. It is easy to read an accident report and dismiss the cause as carelessness or as a dumb mistake. But let's remember that the accident pilot did not get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I'll go have an accident today." Nearly all pilots believe that they are safe. Honest introspection frequently reveals that on some occasion, we might have traveled down that same accident path.
NTSB Photo
This accident proves that regardless of certificates, ratings, flight hours, and airplane sophistication, continuing an unstabilized approach can have a bad ending. This Cessna 560XL with six people onboard experienced a runway excursion. The left seat pilot, age 49, held an ATP certificate and reported 5424 flight hours total time 4ith 412 hours in this make and model with 43 hours in the preceding 30 days. The right seat pilot, age 24, also held an ATP certificate and reported having 1929 hours total flight time 396 hours in this make and model with 20 hours in the preceding 30 days.
NTSB Photo
The NTSB accident report includes the following: "The flight was being operated as a corporate flight with a two-person crew. The captain was the pilot flying (PF) and stated that while on final approach, the airplane was “eating up a lot of runway” before it settled on the runway. He applied full brakes and activated the thrust reversers, but it was not enough to stop the airplane and it subsequently entered the Engineered Material Arresting System (EMAS), which resulted in substantial damage to the pressure vessel. He admitted that he became fixated on landing, failed to take proper remedial actions, and thought he could salvage the approach despite the pilot monitoring’s (PM) repeated go-around commands."
NTSB Photo
The NTSB report continues: "The PM stated that about 2 nautical miles from the runway threshold, the airplane’s descent rate increased, which activated the ground proximity warning “Terrain, Pull Up.” The PM commanded a “go-around” which was not acknowledged by the PF who continued the approach. When the airplane was on a 1-mile final, the PM called for a “go-around” a second time, followed by third as they crossed the runway threshold about 30 to 40 knots too fast. The captain reported that there were no preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation."
NTSB Graphic
The NTSB probable cause finding states: "The captain’s improper decision to continue an unstabilized approach despite several go-around calls by the pilot monitoring, which resulted in a runway excursion and substantial damage to the pressure vessel."
The lesson to be learned is that whether you are an ATP flying a business jet or a recreational pilot flying a light sport airplane, if the approach is not stabilized, do not continue it.
Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.
Accidents discussed in this section are presented in the hope that pilots can learn from the misfortune of others and perhaps avoid an accident. It is easy to read an accident report and dismiss the cause as carelessness or as a dumb mistake. But let's remember that the accident pilot did not get up in the morning and say, "Gee, I think I'll go have an accident today." Nearly all pilots believe that they are safe. Honest introspection frequently reveals that on some occasion, we might have traveled down that same accident path.
Accident Airplane source: FlightAware.com
This crash happened in Indiana eight days before Christmas 2021. The airplane was a Piper PA-32R-300. The 40-year-old instrument rated private pilot left behind a wife and three children. The pilot had 448 flight hours total time with 219 in this make and model.
NTSB Photo
The NTSB accident report includes the following: "Automatic dependent surveillance – broadcast (ADS-B) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) air traffic data revealed that the pilot initially departed Chicago Executive Airport (PWK) at 1618 central standard time en route to Indianapolis Metro Airport (UMP), arriving at 1844 eastern standard time. He subsequently departed UMP at 1925 eastern standard time with an intended destination of BMG. After departure from UMP, the airplane proceeded on course to the southwest, then to the south, and climbed to an altitude of about 4,000 ft mean sea level (msl). Upon contacting the BMG approach controller, the pilot was instructed to descend to 3,000 ft msl and issued radar vectors for the instrument landing system approach to runway 35."
NTSB Photo
The NTSB report continues: "About 2003, the controller issued an intercept heading to the pilot and cleared him for the approach. About 2005, the pilot reported that the flight was established on the approach and the controller instructed the pilot to contact the control tower. The tower controller subsequently cleared the pilot to land; however, the pilot never responded. The airplane tracked inbound along the ILS runway 35 localizer. At 2006:58, the airplane passed the final approach fix (NITTE); the airplane’s altitude was about 2,258 ft msl at that time. After the airplane passed NITTE, the flight path appeared to become more erratic in comparison to the airplane flight path before passing NITTE. At 2008:15, the airplane entered a right turn approximately 2.25 miles from the runway. The final data point was recorded at 2008:29; the airplane’s altitude was about 1,045 ft msl at that time.
Airspeed and climb/descent rates derived from ADS-B position and altitude data indicated the airplane was stabilized about 3,000 ft msl and 120 knots until about 1959. The airspeed then decreased and appeared to stabilize about 110 knots with the airplane remaining about 3,000 ft msl. At 2002:20, a momentary altitude deviation was recorded consisting of a 200 ft loss immediately followed by a 300 ft gain. During this time, the airspeed initially increased and then decreased to as low as 90 knots before recovering. From 2003:00 until 2006:40, the airplane entered a general descent with momentary level offs or climbs. Airspeed during this Page 4 of 8 CEN22FA080 timeframe increased to about 150 knots before decreasing again. Beginning at 2006:40, the airplane entered a continuous descent until the final data point. The average airplane descent rate between the final approach fix and the final ADS-B data point varied from about 400 fpm to over 1,200 fpm."
NTSB Photo
The NTSB probable cause finding states: "The pilot’s failure to follow the instrument landing system (ILS) course guidance, which resulted in the pilot’s loss of airplane control during the instrument approach. Contributing to the accident was the presence of turbulence and low-level wind shear."
NTSB Photo
Again, we see a family tragedy. Though the unstable approach was not mentioned in the probable cause finding, the approach was clearly unstable as mentioned in the analysis text. The pilot's workload during the approach caused the task load to exceed the pilot's capabilities. The pilot had completed a flight review twelve days prior to the crash. According to the pilot's logbook, copies of which are included in the accident docket, the flight review was conducted in a Cessna 172. A considerably slower and much less complex airplane than the Piper Lance. Also, the log entry for the flight review did not list any instrument flight time. The logbook listed actual instrument time as 110.3 and simulated instrument time as 52.7 hours respectively. The logbook appears to indicate that he met recent experience requirements regarding instrument flight hours, but that he had logged only four of the six required instrument approaches. There is no indication of an instrument proficiency check having been completed.
We owe it to our families to take all reasonable steps to maintain our proficiency at a high level. We must be honest with ourselves regarding our capabilities for this flight, on this day, with our present level of proficiency.
Click here to download the accident report from the NTSB website.
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